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AMBIVALENT ADVOCATES: WHY ELITE
UNIVERSITIES COMPROMISED THE CASE FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Jonathan P. Feingold*
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Forthcoming 2022

ABSTRACT
“The end of affirmative action.” The headline is near. When it
arrives, scholars will explain that a controversial set of policies could
not withstand unfriendly doctrine and less friendly Justices. This story
is not wrong. But it is incomplete. Critically, this account masks an
underappreciated source of affirmative action’s enduring instability:
elite universities, affirmative action’s formal champions, have always
been ambivalent advocates.
Elite universities are uniquely positioned to shape legal and lay
opinions about affirmative action. They are formal defendants in
affirmative action litigation and objects of public obsession. And yet,
schools like Harvard and the University of North Carolina—embroiled
in litigation now before the Supreme Court—avoid the facts and
theories that would buttress their own race-conscious programs against
predictable lines of attack. As a result, affirmative action’s formal
advocates enable the case against affirmative action.
In this Article, I explore the source of this ambivalence.
Specifically, I examine how common institutional dynamics
*
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disincentivize elite universities from marshaling the most compelling
case for their own policies, thereby compromising the case for
affirmative action in the court of law and the court of public opinion.
The consequences transcend legal skirmishes over race-conscious
admissions. For decades, affirmative action debates have stood in for
more fundamental fights over what, if anything, is necessary to
overcome America’s legacy of legalized white supremacy.
Accordingly, when university defendants understate the case for
affirmative action, they do more than compromise their own modest
interventions. They also enable a resurgent right-wing campaign to
discredit antiracism as the new racism, and antiracists as the new
racists.
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INTRODUCTION
Harvard University and the University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill (“UNC”) belong to an exclusive club. In 2021, both triggered
public backlash after denying tenure to a distinguished Black scholar.
At Harvard, the university failed to tenure Cornell West, one of
America’s most influential thought leaders.1 Harvard ultimately
reconsidered, but not before West departed for Union Theological
Seminar—a move he attributed, in part, to Harvard’s “pattern of
denying tenure to scholars of color.”2
A similar script unfolded at UNC. In May 2021, UNC’s Board of
Trustees (“Board”) voted not to tenure Nikole Hannah-Jones,3 whose

1

For an interview with West: George Yancy, Cornel West: The Whiteness of
Harvard and Wall Street is “Jim Crow, New Style,” TRUTHOUT (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://truthout.org/articles/cornel-west-the-whiteness-of-harvard-and-wall-streetis-jim-crow-new-style/. This followed another high-profile incident where Harvard
denied tenure to its only Black Latinx professor. See Graciela Mochkofsky, Why
Lorgia García Peña was Denied Tenure at Harvard, NEW YORKER (July 27, 2021)
https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-education/why-lorgia-garcia-penawas-denied-tenure-at-harvard. In February 2022, the Yale School of Medicine
received widespread criticism after denying tenure to a celebrated scholar of racism
and inequality. See Isaac Yu & Sanchita Kedia, SOM tenure denial sparks debate on
diversity
in
academia,
Yale
Daily
News
(Feb.
23,
2022),
https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2022/02/23/som-tenure-denial-sparks-debate-ondiversity-in-academia/ (noting that the scholar’s “body of work has been cited more
than 10,000 times”).
2

Meera S. Nair & Andy Z. Wang, Cornel West to Depart Harvard, Return to Union
Theological Seminary, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 9, 2020, 12:28 AM),
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2021/3/9/cornel-west-to-leave-to-union/.
3

Reporting traced the tenure decision to a powerful donor critical of Hannah-Jones’
1619 Project. See Margaret Sullivan, Why it’s so Important that UNC Trustees Give
Nikole Hannah-Jones the Tenure She Deserves, WASH. POST (June 29, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/unc-nikole-hannah-jonestenure/2021/06/28/cb51a03e-d82a-11eb-bb9e-70fda8c37057_story.html.
This
incident tracks a history, at UNC and beyond, of influential donors intervening in
university governance to oppose antiracist efforts—including race-conscious
admissions. See Petition to Intervene at 6, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516) (“Defendants may face additional pressure from alumni of the
University—often key donors and fundraisers—who might oppose race-conscious

3
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distinguished resume includes a MacArthur Genius Fellowship and the
heralded 1619 Project.4 Following public pressure spearheaded by
UNC’s Black student leaders,5 the Board reversed course.6 HannahJones, in a move that paralleled West, took her talents to Howard
University—one of the nation’s most renowned Historically Black
Colleges and Universities. To explain her decision, Hannah-Jones
located her experience within UNC’s ongoing failure to reckon with
its own legacy of white supremacy:
It is not my job to heal this university, to force the reforms necessary
to ensure the Board of Trustees reflects the actual population of the
school and the state, or to ensure that the university leadership lives up
to the promises it made to reckon with its legacy of racism and
injustice.7

These episodes are noteworthy in themselves. But they are not

admissions programs or who might seek to maintain preferential admissions for their
children—even if to the detriment of African-American and Latino students.”).
4

The Board disregarded Hannah-Jones’ colleagues and academic department, all of
whom supported her tenure case. See Katie Robertson, Nikole Hannah-Jones Denied
Tenure at University of North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/19/business/media/nikole-hannah-jonesunc.html.
5

See Annie Ma, Black Students, Faculty: UNC Needs Self-Examination on Race,
ASSOC’D. PRESS (July 7, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/business-racial-injusticerace-and-ethnicity-education-7fca1c1b2c97788d409a34c63e149afd.
6

See David Kolkenflik, After Contentious Debate, UNC Grants Tenure to Nikole
Hannah-Jones,
NPR
(June
30,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/06/30/1011880598/after-contentious-debate-unc-grantstenure-to-nikole-hannah-jones (reporting that the UNC Trustees voted to grant
Hannah-Jones tenure “several months after refusing to consider her proposed
tenure”).
7

Press Release, Legal Defense Fund, Nikole Hannah-Jones Issues Statement on
Decision to Decline Tenure Offer at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and
to Accept Knight Chair Appointment at Howard University (July 6, 2021)
https://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/nikole-hannah-jones-issues-statement-ondecision-to-decline-tenure-offer-at-university-of-north-carolina-chapel-hill-and-toaccept-knight-chair-appointment-at-howard-university/.

4
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what distinguishes Harvard and UNC from other elite schools.8 Rather,
the distinction comes from the context in which these incidents
occurred. In the same moment that Harvard and UNC faced scrutiny
for mistreating preeminent Black scholars, they also comprised—and
remain—the last line of defense between affirmative action9 and a
Supreme Court more hostile to civil rights than any since before Brown
v. Board of Education.10 There is little reason to believe the line will
8

The episodes track a broader phenomenon of anti-Black bias in higher education.
See Meera Deo, Trajectory of a Law Professor, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 441 (2015).
The term “affirmative action” has been used to describe a range of policies and
practices that promote access and inclusion within employment, education, and other
domains of American society. Cf. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:
A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1118
(2006) (“[Affirmative action] includes a broad range of policies and practices that
are designed to respond to past discrimination, prevent current discrimination, and
promote certain societal goals . . . . Affirmative action programs may be facially raceor gender-neutral (for example, broadcasting widely a particular employment
opportunity) or race- or gender-contingent (for example, providing some resource to
a woman or racial/ethnic minority under circumstances in which that person would
not have received the resource but for that person’s status as a woman or minority.”);
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 921 (1996). Within this Article, unless otherwise stated, I employ
“affirmative action” interchangeably with the term “race-conscious admissions” as
shorthand for policies that permit reviewers to consider an applicant’s race during a
selection process.
9

10

On January 24, 2022, the Supreme Court agreed to hear and consolidated
admissions lawsuits at Harvard and UNC. See Order Granting Cert, SFFA v.
Harvard, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/012422zor_m6io.pdf.
The Supreme Court’s current rightwing majority has already rolled back civil rights
gains in the domains spanning voting, reproductive justice, and racial inclusion. See
Kermit Roosevelt III, The Supreme Court has been Engaged in a Rollback of Rights.
Abortion Would Just Be the Latest, TIME (May 16, 2022),
https://time.com/6176168/supreme-court-overturned-rights-history/. Both Harvard
and UNC prevailed below. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &
Fellow of Harv. Coll., 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding Harvard’s raceconscious admissions policy); Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 319
F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (upholding UNC’s race-conscious admissions policy).
The Board that denied tenure to Hannah-Jones is a named defendant in the UNC
litigation. See UNC Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
at 1, ¶5, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. The Univ. N.C. 319 F.R.D. 490
(M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 14-cv-00954) (naming as defendant “the University and

5
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hold.11
Elite universities have long embodied this duality. They constitute
sites of institutionalized racism, on the one hand, and stand as
affirmative action’s formal champions, on the other. The dynamic is

certain of its employees, the University of North Carolina Board of Governors and
its individual members, and the University of North Carolina System and its
president.”).
See Harvard Race Case Punctuates Supreme Court’s Turn to Right, Bloomberg
News (Jan. 24, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/harvard-racecase-punctuates-supreme-courts-sharp-turn-to-right (“They really are in this sort of
moment where they can do whatever they like,” said Melissa Murray, a constitutional
law professor at New York University. The decision to hear the admissions case
suggests that “they’re just checking things off their list and affirmative action will be
next.”). Stare decisis is the principal that the Supreme Court will adhere to existing
precedent absent extraordinary circumstances that counsel otherwise. See Stare
Decisis, Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (last visited May 31, 2022),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis. The Supreme Court’s current
rightwing majority has shown little respect for stare decisis—particularly when the
relevant precedent advances racial and gender justice. See Alison Frankel, With
Supreme Court poised to ditch Roe, does precedent matter anymore?, Reuters (May
3, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/with-supreme-court-poisedditch-roe-does-precedent-matter-anymore-2022-05-03/. It is not difficult to count
five Justices ready to conclude that affirmative action violates the Constitution or
federal law. Chief Justice Roberts, now the closest to a “swing” Justice, has noted
his antipathy for any race-conscious government action. See Parents Involved v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). At least three other
Justices appear ready to prohibit schools from even considering an admissions
policy’s racial impact. See Order in Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax Cty. School Bd. (Apr.
25, 2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/042522zr_3fb4.pdf
(denying request to vacate stay in case challenging Virginia school board’s decision
to alter admission criteria in order to promote racial diversity; with Justices Thomas,
Alito, and Gorsuch dissenting).
11

6
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not new.12 But it remains underappreciated and undertheorized.13 As a
result, standard accounts continue to overlook a source of affirmative
action’s perpetual precarity: elite universities—affirmative action’s
formal, but ever-ambivalent, advocates.
Two high-profile lawsuits challenging the admissions practices at
Harvard and UNC, now consolidated before the Supreme Court,
reinforce this dynamic.14 Even as Harvard and UNC defend their right
to consider an applicant’s race, they omit critical facts and theories that
would fortify the case for their own policies.15
But the problem transcends what the universities leave on the
table.16 To begin, Harvard and UNC—consistent with past university
defendants—have resisted third-party efforts to develop a more robust

See infra Part II (discussing the University of California’s ambivalence toward
affirmative action in Regents of California v. Bakke, the first race-conscious
admissions case to receive substantive Supreme Court review). See also Alan
Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the Defense
of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263, 309 (1999) (identifying the facts
and theories that affirmative action advocates often leave on the table).
12

13

At least two threads of scholarship have engaged this dynamic. One thread has
explored how procedural rules privilege the voice of university defendants over
third-party stakeholders—even when those stakeholders would better defend
affirmative action. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 12. The other thread has critiqued
how university defendants tend to reproduce conservative frames that portray
affirmative action as a “racial preference.” See, e.g., Luke Charles Harris & Uma
Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of
“Preferential Treatment”, in SEEING RACE AGAIN 246-266 (Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw ed., 2019). This Article is the first to integrate these distinct threads within
a single piece of scholarship.
14

See supra note 11.

15

See Jonathan Feingold, Colorblind Capture¸102 B.U. L. REV. _(forthcoming 2022)
(explaining, for example, that Harvard and UNC have failed to foreground the many
facially race-neutral dimensions of their respective admissions processes that confer
racial advantages on white students—racial advantages that affirmative action is
well-suited to mitigate).
16

Devon W. Carbado, Footnote 43: Recovering Justice Powell's Anti-Preference
Framing of Affirmative Action, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1117, 1149 (2019) (arguing
that liberals tend to defend affirmative action “in lukewarm and defensive terms as a
‘preference’ whose costs are begrudgingly justifiable”).

7
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factual record and compelling legal narrative.17 In other words,
affirmative action’s formal defenders have actively obstructed the
admission of evidence that would benefit affirmative action.
Compounding this dynamic, Harvard and UNC privilege arguments
that invite predictable lines of legal and political attack. This includes

17

In both cases, student intervenors have tried to develop a factual record that
highlights past and present manifestations of racial discrimination attributable to the
university and to frame affirmative action as a necessary countermeasure for that
conduct. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed DefendantIntervenors’ Motion to Intervene at 15, SFFA v. UNC, 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C.
2017) (No. 14-cv-954) (seeking “to present evidence showing that UNC-Chapel
Hill’s current admissions policy is necessary in part because it helps remedy the long
history of segregation and discrimination in North Carolina, including within the
University itself”); See also id. (“This [unfavorable] outcome could result if the
Court does not consider or weigh (or cannot consider or weigh because the record is
insufficiently developed) the history of discrimination at UNC-Chapel Hill, the
inextricable link between that history and UNC’s current compelling interest in
student body diversity, and the adverse effect that elements of the current admissions
process have on the diversity of the student population.”). Harvard and UNC both
objected to the students’ attempt to intervene. See Harvard’s Response to Motion to
Intervene, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellow of Harv. Coll.
807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015); Defendants’ Response to Motion to Intervene, Students
for Fair Admissions Inc. v. Univ. of N.C. 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017). This
resistance to intervention is not new. In 2003, Professor Cheryl Harris commented
on similar dynamics in Grutter and Gratz. See Cheryl I. Harris, What the Supreme
Court Did Not Hear in Grutter and Gratz, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 697, 697 (2003) (“It
might seem like after all the briefs, all the arguments, all the ink (I think there were
a record number of amicus briefs filed in this case), that it would be difficult to argue,
as I am today, that there is something that the Supreme Court didn't hear in Grutter.
But perhaps it is an inevitable part of making history that certain stories are left
untold.”); see also Jenkins, supra note 12 at 309 (“[A]n affirmative action defendant
cannot advance a vigorous defense of its program on remedial grounds without
risking liability to beneficiaries and others under the Constitution [or Title VI] . . .
for defendants who are recipients of federal funds.”). Beyond litigation, scholarly
debates about affirmative action long sidelined the voices, experience, and expertise
of scholars of color. See Derrick Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual
Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 4 (1979) (“The exclusion of
minorities from meaningful participation in the Bakke litigation and, for that matter,
from much of the scholarly debate over the case, was more polite, but no less firm.
Minority interests were not represented on either side of the counsel table as the
Bakke case wound its way through the court. Allen Bakke’s counsel opposed the
interests of minorities; attorneys for [UC], except perhaps by comparison with Mr.
Bakke's position, could hardly claim to speak for minorities.”).

8
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treating their own admissions practices as justifiable discrimination—
that is, “preferential treatment” that benefits Black and brown students
over “more qualified” and “deserving” white (and, at times, Asian)
applicants.18 This “affirmative action-as-preference” framing is
ubiquitous. But it is not inevitable. To the contrary, Harvard and UNC
could defend race-conscious admissions as necessary antidiscrimination—that is, a modest prophylactic that mitigates the many
racial advantages that standard selection processes confer upon white
applicants.19 Yet rather than defend their own policies on this basis,
18

In a companion project, I detail how university defendants reproduce colorblind
logics that undermine the case for affirmative action. See Feingold, supra note 16.
This includes the common reflex to frame affirmative action as “preferential
treatment” that injects race into an otherwise race-neutral process. See Luke Charles
Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action As Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging
the Myth of “Preferential Treatment”, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 127, 132 (2000)
(“[Affirmative action] defenders continue to characterize these policies as
‘preferential treatment,‘ but argue that these preferences are justified, either as forms
of ‘compensation‘ or on grounds of ‘social utility.’”); Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race
Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1220 (2002) (“Yet an increasing
source of frustration was the inadequacy of the liberal response that too often
accepted the premise that race consciousness amounted to racism and that too often
argued for race-conscious remediation as temporary, exceptional, and aberrational
within an otherwise neutral legal frame.”).
See Harris, supra note 17 (“The mainstream press has thus framed affirmative
action as a hot issue about race in which opinion is polarized over whether racial
preferences are fair or not. . . . It assumes the position or conclusion regarding the
very thing that is under debate: Is a particular policy reverse discrimination or a racial
preference, or is it a justifiable measure to eliminate the effects of past and current
discrimination.”). Reframing affirmative action as “necessary anti-discrimination”
repositions race-conscious admissions as a modest attempt to mitigate racial
advantages that white students enjoy and racial disadvantages that students of color
confront during and after the admissions process. See, e.g., Brief of Experimental
Psychologists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher v. University
of Texas (Aug. 13, 2012) (No. 01-1015) ([S]tandardized test scores and high school
GPAs systematically underestimate the true talents of many members of minority
groups stigmatized as intellectually inferior. . . . A[ race-conscious] admissions
policy that takes proper account of stereotype threat is not a departure from meritbased admissions, but is rather an effort to achieve more accurate merit-based
admissions.”); Defendant-Intervenors’ Response to Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, SFFA v. UNC 14-CV-954 (“Student-Intervenors
testified that UNC’s race-conscious policy helps to counteract the lingering effects
19

9
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Harvard and UNC actively resist third-party attempts to do so.20
This tendency to treat affirmative action as a departure from racial
neutrality tracks decades of ambivalent advocacy.21 Critically, the
consequences transcend the legal fate of race-conscious admissions.22
As much as any legal dispute, affirmative action litigation implicates
broader societal debates about the relevance of race and racism in
America—and what, if anything, is needed to remedy a legacy of
racialized subordination. As a result, when elite universities understate
the case for affirmative action, they do more than compromise their
own policies. They also normalize a regressive narrative that
delegitimizes antiracism itself.23 This dynamic has always been
problematic.24 But in a moment marked by unrelenting backlash—
including a targeted disinformation campaign against antiracist
reform—the enduring ambivalence of elite universities requires

of UNC’s legacy of exclusion by impacting their perception of UNC as welcoming
to underrepresented minority students.”).
20

See infra Part I.2(1) (outlining Harvard and UNC’s opposition to interveners).

See Carbado, supra note 17 at 1131 (“At bottom, I am urging liberal members of
the Court to do what, for the past forty years, they have not done — force
conservative justices to affirmatively defend, rather than merely take for granted,
their claim that affirmative action is a racial preference.”
21

22

Others have noted how the stories we tell about affirmative action can be as
important as the policies themselves. See Khiara M. Bridges, Class-Based
Affirmative Action, or the Lies That We Tell About the Insignificance of Race, 96
B.U. L. REV. 55, 57–58 (2016) (“[P]ursuant to our thick understanding of racial
justice, it is not enough that racial minorities merely are present at schools from
which they have been excluded. Equally if not more important are the stories that we
tell about why they are there.”); Barbara J. Flagg, Diversity Discourses, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 827, 851 (2004) (“[M]y own assessment is that the discursive damage done by
Grutter is at least equal in significance to its concrete benefits.”).
23

See Feingold, supra <Colorblind Country> (explaining that when elite universities
locate racial discrimination in an ignoble past, they mute calls for race-conscious
remedies in the present).
24

See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331 (1988).

10
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scholarly attention.25
Accordingly, this Article asks why affirmative action’s formal
defenders bolster the case against, not for, affirmative action. More
concretely, I explore how institutional dynamics common to elite
universities disincentivize more zealous advocacy for their own raceconscious policies.26 These dynamics interact with procedural rules
that privilege university defendants above other affirmative action
advocates.27 In short, reinforcing institutional dynamics and litigation
structure produces an adversarial context that pits uncompromising
affirmative action opponents against ambivalent affirmative action
advocates.
Surfacing this story serves two purposes. First, it broadens and
sharpens common accounts of affirmative action’s legal and political
instability.28 Second, it reminds us that racial retrenchment has always

25

Others have detailed how moments of racial progress (e.g., the Civil War
Amendments) have been followed by prolonged periods of racial backlash and
retrenchment (e.g., Jim Crow). See id. at 1364 (“Without such an analysis of racism's
role in maintaining hegemony, [Alan Freeman’s] explanation simply does not
convincingly capture the political realities of racism and the inevitability of white
backlash against any serious attempts to dismantle the machinery of white
supremacy.”). We are in the midst of a similar dynamic, in which 2020’s global
uprising for racial justice has triggered a nationwide assault on antiracist efforts and
basic civil rights stretching from public education to voting. See Amy Gardner, Kate
Rabinowitz & Harry Stevens, How GOP-Backed Voting Measures Could Create
Hurdles for Tens of Thousands of Voters, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2021); Olivia B.
Waxman, ‘Critical Race Theory is Simply the Latest Bogeyman.’ Inside the Fight
Over What Kids Learn About America’s History, TIME (July 16, 2021).
26

See infra Part II.

27

See infra Part I.2.

28

The standard story foregrounds unfriendly doctrine, hostile Justices, and a
skeptical public. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Judging Opportunity Lost:
Assessing the Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University
of Texas, Austin, 62 UCLA L. REV. 272, 278-84 (2015) (providing a “brief history”
of affirmative action). This story is not wrong. But it is incomplete and, potentially,
misleading. To begin, the Supreme Court has exhibited hostility toward antiracist
projects since the post-Civil War era. See C.R. Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883) (“When
a man has emerged from slavery ... there must be some stage in progress of his
elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special

11
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been a bipartisan project—one that cannot succeed without
concessions from liberal elites.29
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines how legal
doctrine and cultural norms position elite universities to shape our
national affirmative action debates. Part II then explores why elite
universities often resist facts and theories that would buffer their own
race-conscious policies against legal scrutiny and political attacks.
Specifically, I surface three dynamics that render elite institutions
ambivalent affirmative action advocates: (a) commitment gaps,30
(b) perceived conflicts of interest,31 and (c) risk aversion.32
I.

A PRIVILEGED VOICE ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Elite universities are uniquely positioned to shape how we think about,
talk about, and feel about affirmative action. This privileged posture derives
from two sources: (1) the public’s preoccupation with elite schools and (2) a
litigation structure that centers the voices and perspectives of university
defendants. Put differently, relative to other affirmative action advocates,
elite universities enjoy outsized influence in the court of law and the court of
public opinion.
favorite of the laws.”). But campaigns to discredit antiracism have always benefitted
from the failure of mainstream liberals to defend such policies as necessary
antidiscrimination. See Jonathan Feingold, Reclaiming CRT: How Regressive Laws
Can Advance Regressive Ends, 74 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2022); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism,
94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009) (explaining why affirmative action, albeit
controversial, constitutes a modest policy intervention).
29

Cf. Devon Carbado & Jonathan Feingold, Rewriting Whren v. United States, 68
UCLA L. Rev. 1678, 1686 (2022) (“In the present context, the greater good is the
so-called “war on drugs”—a now decades-long and bipartisan campaign ostensibly
intended to combat illegal drug use in America.”).
See infra Part II.A (discussing how “integrationist” institutions have never valued
racial inclusion as much as “segregationist” institutions valued racial exclusion).
30

31

See infra Part II.B (discussing how elite universities often perceive a conflict
between arguments that would strengthen the case for affirmative action and other
institutional interests in brand and budget).
32

See infra Part II.C (discussing how aversion to legal exposure incentivizes elite
university administrators and their attorneys to avoid behavior before and during
litigation that, if undertaken, would strengthen compromises the case for raceconscious admissions).
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This privileged perch matters. As noted above, affirmative action
disputes often serve as proxies for broader fights over the contemporary
relevance of race and racism in America. Accordingly, when a university
defendant understates the case for affirmative action, it does more than
compromise the legal viability of a specific practice or policy. It also
normalizes, in public discourse, regressive talking points designed to that
erode any legal or moral distinction between legalized racial subordination
(e.g., Jim Crow) and race-conscious efforts to remedy that history (e.g.,
affirmative action).33
Translated to the present, litigation at Harvard and UNC is about more
than race-conscious university admissions. These lawsuits also function as
public referenda on the meaning of racism itself—and, by extension, whether
antiracism is a moral and just project. In other words, these lawsuits comprise
fronts in a broader campaign of racial retrenchment and backlash.34 Harvard
and UNC, given their privileged posture, are uniquely suited to contest the
regressive rhetoric underlying this campaign by championing race-conscious
admissions as a modest but critical form of antidiscrimination that counters
the vestiges of Jim Crow that continue to shape our world. Thus far, they
have failed to do so.

A. The Source of Privilege
1. Public Preoccupation
In many respects, elite universities and their students are
unrepresentative of the average American university and college student.35
For this reason alone, many have criticized the attention these institutions
garner.36 That said, elite universities—and Ivy League schools in particular—
remain objects of public obsession.37 Two recent examples are illustrative.

33

See Flagg, supra note <Diversity Discourses>.

34

See Jonathan Feingold, CRT Upside Down, 73 S.C. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2022)
(outlining multiple fronts in ongoing political, discursive, and judicial campaign of
racial retrenchment).
35

See Ben Casselman, Shut Up About Harvard, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/shut-up-about-harvard/ (arguing that a “focus on
elite schools ignores the issues most college students face”).
36

See, e.g., id.

37

See Jeffrey Selingo, Our Dangerous Obsession with Harvard, Stanford and other
Elite
Universities,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
5,
2016),
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First, in March 2019, the Department of Justice disclosed “Operation
Varsity Blues,” a federal investigation into a college bribery scheme that
implicated “high-profile actresses, lawyers, CEOs, vintners, a fashion
designer and more.”38 Among other unlawful conduct, the scandal involved
“bribing coaches and university administrators and arranging for falsified test
scores on students’ entrance exams.”39 More broadly, the scandal illuminated
the myriad ways that parents often leverage their personal wealth, networks,
and influence to secure their children’s admission at elite schools.40 In this
respect, the “Varsity Blues” scandal provoked outrage because of the naked
corruption wealthy parents exerted over a process that already favors students
(like their children) who come from wealth and privilege.41
But the episode also reflected a broader obsession with prestigious
universities—an obsession that transcends the nation’s wealthiest families.42
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/04/05/our-dangerousobsession-with-harvard-stanford-and-other-elite-universities/ (“It’s also the time
when seemingly everyone involved in the college search process — from the media
to school counselors — are obsessed with the admissions decisions Harvard and
dozens of other selective colleges and universities have made.”).
Feroze Dhanoa, “Operation Varsity Blues”: College Cheating Scheme Names
Dozens,
PATCH.COM,
(Mar.
12,
2019),
https://patch.com/massachusetts/boston/college-admissions-cheating-scheme-fedsannounce-charges; See also 8 Outrageous Details From the U.S. College Scam Court
Documents, CBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/uscollege-scam-court-cheating-1.5055097.
38

39

8 Outrageous Details, supra note 37.

40

See Matt Kwong, What Bribery in U.S. College Admissions Says About the 'Myth'
of Meritocracy, CBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/uscollege-scam-court-cheating-myth-meritocracy-1.5055854 (“The scandal, in other
words, is not just the crimes, said Jeet Heer, an associate editor with The New
Republic who comments frequently on U.S. culture and politics. ‘The scandal is what
is legal.’”).
See Jonathan Feingold, All (Poor) Lives Matter”: How Class-Not-Race Logic
Reinscribes Race and Class Privilege, U. Chi. L. Rev. Online 47, 56-57 (2020)
(outlining how standard measures of merit—e.g., standardized tests—benefit classprivileged white applicants with “an uneven playing field that rewards inherited race
and class privilege”); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Smith v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. RG19046222 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2019)
(arguing that the SAT and ACT are neither race- nor class-neutral because they
function on “prox[ies] for students’ wealth and accumulated advantage”).
41

42

See Abby Mims, I Helped Get Rich Kids into Elite Colleges. Obsessed Parents
Drove Me Away, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2019).
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For many Americans, elite universities confer symbolic and material
benefits. To begin, many “Americans’ identities are often intertwined with
their post-secondary brands.”43 In other words, for many, an individual’s
sense of self is inseparable from the university that person attends. The more
prestigious or highly regarded the institution, the better it reflects on the
students there enrolled.
As for material benefits, access to elite schools is often viewed as a
prerequisite to a life of comfort and privilege in the United States.44 This
perception extends beyond universities to secondary, primary, and even early
childhood education.45 This obsession with prestige shows no signs of
waning.46 Nor is it void of merit.47 For decades, America has seen rising
wealth gaps alongside the ever-increasing scarcity of employment
opportunities for individuals without a college degree.48 One can understand

43

Kwong, supra note 43.

44

See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel & Susan Svrluga, Former students sue Georgetown,
Columbia and other elite universities over financial aid practices, WASH. POST (Jan.
10, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/01/10/universityfinancial-aid-lawsuit/ (“These elite universities are gatekeepers to the American
Dream, and they are closing the gate more than they should.”).
45

See Osamudia James, Risky Education, 89 Geo. WASH. L. REV. 667, 718 (2021)
(“Like selective school enrollment in New York, parents perceive access to elite
higher education as essential to ensuring student success.”).
46

See Melissa Korn, Ivy League Colleges Report Dramatic Growth in EarlyAdmission Applicant Pools, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2020) (“Early-admission
applications to Ivy League colleges skyrocketed this year, as anxious high-school
seniors tried to boost their chances of getting into some of the most selective schools
in the country.”).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (“[U]niversities, and in
particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our
Nation’s leaders. . . . The pattern is even more striking when it comes to highly
selective law schools. A handful of these schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United
States Senators, 74 United States Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the
more than 600 United States District Court judges.”).
47

48

See Heather Long, Many left behind in this recovery have something in common:
No
college
degree,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
22,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/04/22/jobs-no-college-degree/; see
also John A. Powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L.
REV. 785, 806 (2009) (“At a time of perceived scarcity and contracting government
budgets, targeted policies may be viewed as favoring some constituent group rather
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how the resulting economic anxieties translate to competition over limited
spots in institutions associated with wealth and privilege. At the same time,
this obsession overlooks (and can obscure) that prestigious universities—
unlike their less-prestigious counterparts—are far better at reproducing
privilege than catalyzing social mobility.49 In other words, the universities
that provide the most economic mobility to students from low-income
backgrounds are not Ivy League staples like Harvard or elite public schools
like UNC. Rather, the schools that “create a consistent path to the middle
class” tend to be state schools that “enroll mostly low- and moderate-income
students.”50
A 2021 incident at Yale Law School (“YLS”) further reflects our public
fascination with elite institutions. In the spring of 2021, a minor personnel
involving a controversial YLS professor matter ballooned into a public
spectacle. In brief, the underlying “drama” arose out of a meeting with the
professor and two students at the professor’s residence.51 As Elizabeth
Bruenig reported, at least three major and highly regarded publications “gave
the mysterious affair a lengthy report.”52 To be clear, the underlying incident

than the public good. If the target group is historically disfavored or considered
‘undeserving,’ targeted policies risk being labeled ‘preferences’ for ‘special
interests.’). Elite universities are responsible, in part, for perceived and actual
scarcity. See Sam Haselby, The Ivy League vs Democracy (Apr. 25, 2021),
https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/break-up-the-ivy-league-cartel (“In 1940, the
acceptance rate at Harvard was eighty-five percent. In 1970, it was twenty percent.
This year, for the class of 2025, it was 3.4 percent.”).
49

See Adam Howard & Ruben Gaztambide-Fernandez, EDUCATING ELITES: CLASS
(2010).

PRIVILEGE AND EDUCATIONAL ADVANTAGE
50

Michael Itzkowitz, Out With the Old, In With the New: Rating Higher Ed by
Economic Mobility, THIRD WAY, https://www.thirdway.org/report/out-with-the-oldin-with-the-new-rating-higher-ed-by-economic-mobility (Jan. 27, 2022) (noting that
the “schools shown to provide the most economic mobility are all Hispanic-serving
Institutions . . . located in California, Texas, and New York”).
Elizabeth Bruenig, The New Moral Code of America’s Elite, THE ATL. (July 28,
2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/07/amy-chua-yale-lawschool-real-story-dinner-party/619558/. It was understood among students that, due
to past incidents, YLS had prohibited this professor from hosting students for private
engagements at her residence. See id.
51

52

See id.

16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4138470

Draft – do not cite or distribute without author’s permission

arguably called for some level of institutional inquiry.53 That said, it is hard
to imagine public interest in the controversy had it occurred somewhere other
than Yale (or a comparably elite institution). More concretely, had the
incident occurred at the University of New Haven (just across town from
Yale), there is no chance it would have garnered such acute interest by The
New York Times, The New Yorker, and New York Magazine and their
readership.
Although comprising two data points, the foregoing examples reflect
the acute and special attention elite universities command from the media
and much of the American public.54 This dynamic affords elite schools a
unique ability to shape national conversations—including longstanding
debates about affirmative action. By extension, elite schools enjoy a
privileged posture to shape resurgent debates over racism’s enduring
relevance in America.55
Below, I turn to another source of this privileged posture: litigation
structure. As I explain, procedural rules and doctrinal norms privilege the
voice of university defendants over other affirmative action advocates. As a
result, universities like Harvard and UNC can mold the legal and institutional
narratives that accompany affirmative action litigation. In effect, basic
litigation structure magnifies the ability of elite universities to shape how we

53

Among other considerations, power dynamics between professors and students
impose a heightened ethical—if not legal—responsibility on institutions to ensure
professors do not abuse that power (whether or not such abuse is intentional). See C.
John Cicero, The Classroom As Shop Floor: Images of Work and the Study of Labor
Law, 20 VT. L. REV. 117, 142 (1995) (“To me, this is evidence of a dynamic at work
where the authority of the professor, like that of a boss, carries with it the power to
coerce (even at a school like CUNY which has endeavored to introduce alternatives
to the hierarchical professor/student relationship).”). Moreover, that baseline
dynamic is even more pronounced when, as here, the professor at issue is recognized
as a “gatekeeper” to more prestigious professional opportunities such as Supreme
Court clerkships.
54

Elite universities remain a common target of ridicule from entities, individuals,
and interests across the political spectrum. The Right, for example, often invokes
elite universities as a potent political foil—an alleged bastion of leftwing
indoctrination that threatens conservative American values. See, e.g., Anemona
Hartocollis & Shawn Hubler, Donald Trump vs. the Ivy League: An Election-Year
Battle,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
21,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/21/us/trump-ivy-league-election.html.
The Supreme Court’s upcoming review of race-conscious admissions at Harvard
and UNC is likely to amplify the attention these two institutions already command
from the media and public.
55
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think and talk about affirmative action—in the courtroom and in the public
square.

2. Litigation Structures
Multiple aspects of litigation structure elevate the voices and
perspectives of elite universities over an array of third parties with a material
stake in affirmative action lawsuits.56 I explore two below: (a) procedural
rules that hinder third party intervention and (b) judicial deference to
university “expertise.”

(1) Procedure Disfavors Intervenors
Features common to civil litigation privilege universities over other
affirmative action advocates in two directions. Standard procedural rules
(a) center the university defendant’s perspective and (b) marginalize, if not
exclude, the views, voices, and perspectives of third parties who would tell a
more comprehensive and compelling affirmative action story.57
As to the former, when an admissions policy is challenged, the
university—as the formal defendant—acquires the right to control the
defense. This entails the authority to determine which defenses to raise,
which theories to invoke, and what evidence to submit.58 Pursuant to this
formal status, the university can craft the underlying legal narrative—that is,
the story that explains what affirmative action is, the function it performs,
and the backdrop against which it intervenes. The prevailing narrative

56

This includes, for example, students of color and civil rights organizations
dedicating to desegregating higher education in America. See Harris, supra note 17
at 702 (noting that in Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court “heard arguments from
the plaintiffs, the University, and even the Solicitor General on behalf of the United
states . . . everyone except these [underrepresented minority] students” who also
possessed “a serious stake in the outcome of the litigation”).
57

See Jenkins, supra note 12 (explaining that procedural rules privilege the
perspective of university defendants over third-party stakeholders who attempt to
highlight how affirmative action is necessary to counter racial (dis)advantages that
benefit white applicants); see also Carbado, supra note 17 (cataloguing “colorblind”
criteria common to university admissions processes that confer “racial preferences”
to white applicants).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest.”).
58
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matters, in part, because it shapes how the court and the public will view the
underlying dispute.59
Moreover, basic litigation structure and related procedural rules
privileges the university’s voice and perspective over third parties—even
when those individuals or entities have a direct stake in the litigation and
would marshal a more compelling affirmative action story.60 Such procedural
rules include Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 24, which prescribes
when a non-party may intervene by right or at the court’s discretion.61 To
intervene as a matter of right, non-parties must demonstrate, inter alia, that
the “existing parties [cannot] adequately represent [the non-party’s]
interest.”62 To warrant permissive intervention, courts consider whether “an
applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common.”63
As I detail in Part II, institutional dynamics dis-incentivize universities
from marshalling the most compelling case for their own policies.64 As a
result, and as Alan Jenkins observed over two decades ago:
Without intervention by [affirmative action] beneficiaries, affirmative
action cases typically pit unsuccessful White applicants and counsel

59

Even if empowered to craft the defense, the university must contend with the facts,
theories, and frames that the plaintiff employs.
60

See Harris, supra note 19 at 702 (explaining that the Grutter student intervenors
“had a serious stake in the outcome of the litigation” and that in “Bakke, the [students
of color] that arguably had the most at stake in the outcome did not have a direct
voice in the case when it was hear”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 24. A party may intervene by right when “[o]n timely motion,” the
movant “(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by federal statute; or (2)
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest.” Id. at 24(a).
61

62

Id.

63

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 308
F.R.D. 39, 45 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). When deciding whether permissive intervention is
warranted, courts “can consider almost any factor rationally relevant, and enjoy[]
very broad discretion in allowing or denying the motion.” Id.
64

See infra Part II (explaining that, among other dynamics, universities are reluctant
to foreground their own racial discrimination—even if that showing would buttress
the case for race-conscious admissions).
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opposed to traditional civil rights enforcement against governments
and other institutions with a history of racial bias and strong incentives
to avoid confessing civil rights liability.65
In the abstract, this dynamic suggests that FRCP 24 creates a viable
vehicle for third-party stakeholders—such as students of color or civil rights
organizations—to attain formal defendant status. In practice, intervenors in
the admissions context have found, at best, mixed success under FRCP 24.66
This trend has extended to the Harvard and UNC lawsuits. In the
Harvard case, putative student intervenors questioned the university’s
“ability and willingness” to advance the strongest affirmative action
defense.67 More specifically, the intervenors argued that Harvard, “so as not
to offend its alumni, faculty, the academic community, or the public,” might
“be hesitant to advance relevant arguments advocating affirmative action as
a remedial step that would expose its own history of past discrimination or to
address ongoing problems with race relations or dissatisfaction with racial
diversity on the campus.”68 Building on this point, the students further argued

Jenkins, supra note 13, at 268. See also id. (“[E]ach party in a bipolar affirmative
action case faces strong disincentives to presenting evidence of recent discrimination
by the defendant or questioning the validity of standardized tests and other selection
criteria that may discriminatorily exclude certain classes of applicants.”). Similar
dynamics overshadowed the Bakke litigation. See Dreyfuss & Lawrence, at 49 (“ . .
. . Bakke was a defensive action, and minorities found themselves on the sidelines,
reminded that despite the rhetoric of progress so popular in the 1970s, most
American institutions remained solely in the hands of white men who made decisions
that would profoundly affect their welfare.”).
65

66

See Jenkins, supra note 13, at 266 (“[S]tudents of color and organizations that
represent them have sought, and been denied, intervention in suits challenging
affirmative action programs at the University of Washington, the University of Texas
Law School, and the Boston Latin Academy.”). This contrasts with affirmative
action litigation outside of the admissions contexts where intervenors have found
greater success. See id. (identifying multiple affirmative action cases from the 1990’s
where district courts granted intervention). At the same time, the Supreme Court has
relaxed standing requirements for parties challenging affirmative action. See id at
264.
Memorandum in Support of Proposed Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene
at 14, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
308 F.R.D. 39 (D.Mass.), aff’d., 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015) (No. 14-cv-14176).
This line of reasoning tracks intervention arguments in past affirmative action
litigation.
67

68

See id.
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that Harvard would omit theories of ongoing discrimination that would
support the constitutional case for affirmative action.69
Harvard objected to intervention.70 Among other arguments, the
university refuted the suggestion that it would inadequately defend its own
program.71 The district court sided with Harvard and denied the motion.72
Even in so doing, the district court recognized that the intervenors would
benefit the litigation. Specifically, the district court granted the students
“amicus plus” status—thus enabling them to substantively participate above
other non-parties.73 Still, Harvard retained primary authority to frame the
case, marshal evidence, and respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments.74 In other
words, the students were given a partial but subordinate voice; Harvard
remained empowered to shape the prevailing narrative that would inform
legal and lay perceptions of the case.
In the UNC litigation, putative intervenors also attacked UNC’s ability
to adequately defend its own admissions policy. Unlike the Harvard movants,
the UNC intervenors sought a limited right to submit evidence on two issues:
(1) “the history of segregation and discrimination at UNC-Chapel Hill and in
North Carolina” and (2) “the effect of UNC-Chapel Hill’s existing, and

69

See id.

See Harvard’s Response to Motion to Intervene, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. 308 F.R.D. 39 (D.Mass.), aff’d., 807 F.3d
472 (1st Cir. 2015) (No. 14-cv-14176).
70

See id. at 1 (“Harvard is mounting a vigorous defense of those policies and
practices, and it looks forward to a successful and expeditious resolution of this
case.”).
71

See Memorandum and Order on Proposed Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion to
Intervene, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
308 F.R.D. 39 (D.Mass.), aff’d., 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015) (No. 14-cv-14176).
72

The district court permitted the student intervenors to: 1) ‘‘submit a brief or
memorandum of law not to exceed 30 pages, exclusive of exhibits, on any dispositive
motion in this case’’; 2) ‘‘participate in oral argument on any dispositive motion’’;
and 3) ‘‘submit personal declarations or affidavits in support of their memorandum
of law, which may be accorded evidentiary weight if otherwise proper.’’ Id. at 23.
73

74

See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Greaves, 110 F.R.D. 549, 552 (D.R.I. 1986)
(explaining that absent intervention, the original parties have the right “to control the
destiny of their own suits”).
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[plaintiff’s] proposed, admissions processes on the critical mass of diverse
students at UNC-Chapel Hill.”75 UNC objected on all fronts.76
Unlike the Harvard litigation, the district court granted the students’
request to submit evidence on the two aforementioned issues.77 Given the
intervenors’ limited status, UNC has retained much of its authority to
construct the narrative and factual record that will inform lay and legal
perceptions of the case. Even so, the intervenors have already affected the
litigation. Through their presence—at trial and within briefing—the
intervenors surfaced and highlighted evidence that tethers the ongoing
relevance of race at UNC to the university’s own history of formal racial
exclusion and white supremacy.78

75

Consolidated Reply in Support of Motion to Intervene at 2, Students for Fair
Admissions Inc. v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 14cv-954). The district court distinguished the intervenors motion from that in the
Harvard litigation. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 12-13, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 14cv-954) (“However, the factual circumstances of the two cases are distinguishable.
Unlike in Harvard College, where the proposed intervenors sought to participate as
full-fledged parties to the action, Proposed Intervenors here seek only limited
participation in this action. Further, UNC-Chapel Hill, as a public institution, subject
to state funding and regulations, is distinguishable from Harvard, a private
institution. Over 80% of UNC-Chapel Hill’s entering freshman class must come
from North Carolina, a state which has its own history of discrimination and
segregation.”).
See Defendants’ Response to Motion to Intervene, Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 2015 WL 4764171 (M.D.N.C.) (objecting to
intervention on the basis that UNC adequately represented the intervenors’ interests,
intervention would delay the litigation, and that intervenors could meaningfully
participate as Amici curiae).
76

77

See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 12-13, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 14-cv-954).
See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors’ Brief in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 2019
WL 1339089 (M.D.N.C.) (“North Carolina has a ‘sordid,’ ‘shameful,’ and
‘disgraceful’ history of state sponsored racial discrimination, which includes
excluding African-American and other students of color from UNC-Chapel Hill.”)
(internal citation omitted).
78
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This context would not have entered the case but for the intervenors.79
To appreciate its impact on the litigation, one need only look to the district
court’s opinion upholding UNC’s admissions policy. Specifically, the court
cited “credible evidence that UNC ‘has been a strong and active promoter of
white supremacy and racist exclusion for most of its history.’”80 The
underlying testimony came not from UNC, but rather from one of the
intervenors’ experts.81 The same expert testified, and the district court noted,
that UNC’s complicity transcends affirmative white supremacist conduct in
the past. The court, drawing on the intervenors’ expert, further observed that
although “faculty, administrators and trustees have made important strides to
reform the institution’s racial outlook and policies, . . . those efforts have
fallen short of repairing a deep-seated legacy of racial hostility and disrespect
for people of color.”82
In essence, the intervenors did what UNC would not. They defended
race-conscious admissions as a mechanism to reckon with the enduring
relevance of race at UNC and throughout North Carolina—a reality that
cannot be understood without linking the present to the past. This story, and
the testimony on which it rests, bolsters the legal case for affirmative action.
But it does more. By exposing how race still matters, the intervenors counter
regressive talking points that deny race’s contemporary force and thereby
insulate inequality—and the systems that produce it—from critique.
It is here, in this site of contestation, that affirmative action litigation
dovetails with broader fights over race and racism in America. This includes
the political Right’s ongoing effort to weaponize Critical Race Theory
(“CRT”) for political and economic gain.83 As journalist Sam Adler-Bell
79

Aside from limited gestures, UNC did not center its own legacy of racial exclusion
and white supremacy as part of that backdrop of racial discrimination that
necessitates race-conscious admissions. As one example, UNC’s post-trial brief did
not include any of the following words or phrases to describe its past or present
conduct vis-à-vis students of color: “discrimination,” “segregation,” or “white
supremacy.” See UNC Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Carolina (M.D.N.C. 2021).
80

See Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 n.5, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Carolina (M.D.N.C. 2021) (No. 14-cv-954)
(describing the expert testimony as an “important contribution to the Court’s
understanding of the context of this case”).
81

See id.

82

Id.

83

See David Theo Goldberg, The War on Critical Race Theory, BOSTON REVIEW
(May 7, 2021), https://bostonreview.net/articles/the-war-on-critical-race-theory/.
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observed, “[a]n unstated goal of demonizing CRT, then, is to eliminate this
insight [of structural racism] from the policy discussion: to shift the blame
for persistent inequalities away from the government and back to individuals
and families.”84 In other words, by stigmatizing concepts such as “systemic
racism,” “affirmative action,” or “antiracism,” regressive projects seek to
explain material inequality as the legitimate consequence of individual or
cultural deficiencies.85
This link between affirmative action litigation and broader cultural
conflicts is one reason why court decisions upholding race-conscious
admissions are not enough to counter regressive theories of inequality. The
explicit rationale guiding and defending those decisions always matters.
When affirmative action advocates—whether it be universities, courts, or
others—characterize such policies as “justifiable discrimination” or
necessary “racial preferences,”86 they normalize conservative narratives that
place racism in an ignoble past and legitimize the status quo. When this
occurs, affirmative action advocates—even when they prevail—erode their
own structuralist accounts of racism and invite false equivalencies between
affirmative action and the legacy it is meant to overcome.

(2) Courts Defer to University Expertise
In addition to the features of litigation outlined above, courts often defer
to university defendants on academic matters that benefit from institutional
expertise. This extends to university admissions policies.87 This deference,
which traces to Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents v. Bakke in 1978,88 is

84

Sam Adler-Bell, Behind the Critical Race Theory Crackdown, THE FORUM (Jan.
13, 2022), https://www.aapf.org/theforum-critical-race-theory-crackdown.
85

Id.

86

Cf. Andy Portinga, Racial Diversity As A Compelling Governmental Interest, 75
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 73, 75–76 (1997) (“The most common argument in favor of
affirmative action is that racial preferences are necessary to remedy the effects of
past discrimination.”) (emphasis added).
87

See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).

438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (“Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the
First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes the selection of its student body.”).
88
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well-established within the Supreme Court’s race-conscious admissions
jurisprudence.89
In Grutter v. Bollinger, where a 5-4 majority upheld the University of
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions policy, Justice O’Connor
invoked this principle. Specifically, she declared that “[t]he Law School’s
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational
mission is one to which we defer.”90 Justice O’Connor further located the
Court’s holding in “our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”91
In 2016, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed this juridical posture in a decision
affirming the University of Texas’s race-conscious admissions policy.
Specifically, in Fisher v. Texas, Justice Kennedy explained that “[o]nce . . .
a university gives a reasoned, principled explanation for its decision,
deference must be given to the University’s conclusion, based on its
experience and expertise, that a diverse student body would serve its
educational goals.”92
Kennedy clarified that deference is not boundless. To begin, “judicial
deference is proper” vis-à-vis a university’s interest in student body
diversity.93 But “no deference is owed when determining whether the use of
race is narrowly tailored to achieve the university's permissible goals.”94 In
other words, deference extends to the compelling interest prong of the
Court’s strict scrutiny analysis, but not to narrow tailoring.95 Moreover, even
within the compelling interest prong, deference has been limited to the
diversity rationale.96 The Supreme Court has not, for example, deferred to

89

See Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2198.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“Our holding today is in keeping
with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”).
90

91

Id.

92

Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208.

93

Id.

94

Id.

Under prevailing equal protection doctrine, a defendant that employs a “racial
classification” must establish that the use of race (a) promotes a compelling interest,
and (b) is narrowly tailored to that end. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 2338.
95

96

Scholars have raised multiple concerns about institutional deference in the
admissions context. See, e.g. Charles Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest:
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institutional judgments concerning other compelling interests—e.g.,
remedying past discrimination.97
At a minimum, the above reveals that deference is far from boundless.
And given the Supreme Court’s current composition, there is reason to
question whether universities will continue to receive the deference they
enjoyed in prior admissions litigation.98 In other words, judicial deference
comes with limits and the Court’s center has swung right. Even so, relative
to other affirmative action advocates, university defendants continue to
possess a privileged position to frame public (as well as judicial) perceptions
about, and attitudes toward, affirmative action. In the next Part, I explain how
universities have failed to leverage this opportunity.

Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 771 (1997) (observing that
Justice Powell’s logic “could as easily justify an all white school as one that is
racially diverse.”); Goodwin Liu, Remarks at the American Constitution Society
Conference, Session E: Segregation, Integration and Affirmative Action After
Bollinger 33-34 (Aug. 2, 2003) (noting that the “academic freedom argument ...
would seem to swing both ways” and could support arguments for segregated
universities if they could be justified on educational grounds); Paul Horwitz,
Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 590 (2005); John Payton, Remarks
at the American Constitution Society Conference, Session E: Segregation,
Integration and Affirmative Action After Bollinger 34 (Aug. 2, 2003), (available at
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/Affirmative%20Action.pdf) (“acknowledg[ing] the
tension [in the academic freedom argument]” and suggesting that the Law School
“tried not to make too much of the academic freedom point” in its brief to the
Supreme Court).
Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“Our conclusion that the Law School has a
compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining
a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission,
and that “good faith” on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to
the contrary.”), with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995)
(refusing to grant deference to Congress in the context of interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause and related federal antidiscrimination measures).
97

Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“We have long recognized that, given the
important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and
thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition.”), with Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 579
U.S. 365, 390 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[The University’s] primary argument
is that merely invoking ‘the educational benefits of diversity’ is sufficient and that it
need not identify any metric that would allow a court to determine whether its plan
is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those interests. This is nothing less than the
plea for deference that we emphatically rejected in our prior decision. Today,
however, the Court inexplicably grants that request.”).
98
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B. Opportunity Lost
Above, I outlined why elite universities enjoy a privileged position to
shape our national affirmative action debates. I also identified that
affirmative action fights often function as a proxy for broader contestation
over the enduring relevance of race and racism in America. By connecting
these points, one sees that Harvard and UNC have a unique opportunity to
enter and shape a growing and, at times, vitriolic, national dialogue over
fundamental questions about who we are as a society—and what, if anything,
is necessary to overcome a legacy of legalized racial subordination. More
than any other affirmative action advocate, these university defendants have
an opportunity to counter a calculated campaign to discredit antiracism as the
new racism, and antiracists as the new racists.99 So far, they have failed to do
so.100
This failure is not surprising. For decades, privileged voices on the Left,
including elite universities, have defended race-conscious admissions as
acceptable “racial preferences”—that is, justifiable discrimination that harms
otherwise deserving whites.101 This framing, which suggests affirmative
action corrupts a race neutral baseline, is neither inevitable nor strategic.102
To begin, it discounts the myriad racial advantages and disadvantages
embedded within standard admissions regimes before affirmative action
arrives.103 This constellation of racial (dis)advantages range from inherited

99

See Benjamin Wallace-Well, How a Conservative Activist Invented the Conflict
Over Critical Race Theory, THE NEW YORKER (June 18, 2021) (quoting rightwing
activist Cristopher Rufo as explaining that “‘Critical race theory’ is the perfect
villain” to counter the growing appeal of progressive politics and antiracism
following 2020’s summer of protests for racial justice).
100

In a companion piece, I offer a more comprehensive account of this failure. See
Feingold, supra note 16. The summary herein is accordingly concise.
101

See id.

102

See id.

103

See Devon W. Carbado et al., Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position
of African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 174, 199-226 (2016) (“providing] empirical evidence to support [the]
claim that black students across class, and not just class-disadvantaged black
students, experience multiple disadvantages that likely affect their academic
performance and the overall competitiveness of their admissions files”).
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race-class privilege and fraught measures of academic “merit,”104 to disparate
treatment and pernicious yet dominant narratives that presume minority
student deficiencies.105 The upshot is simple: most universities employ
facially “colorblind” criteria that extend unearned race-class preferences to
wealthy white applicants.106
Accordingly, one might expect university defendants to defend their
own policies as modest correctives that reduce racial (dis)advantages
embedded throughout the admissions process. Thus, rather than acquiesce to
the common but misleading “preference” framing, advocates could instead
defend affirmative action as a modest “counter-preference”—that is,
antidiscrimination—that, on net, renders the process more objective, neutral,
and fair.107 Or put differently, advocates might stress that accounting for
applicant race occurs against the backdrop of a process that remains defined

104

See Kristen Holmquist et. al., Measuring Merit: The Shultz-Zedeck Research on
Law School Admissions, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 565, 566 (2014) (“The research
confirmed that selection based on this more complete model of lawyering [than the
LSAT alone] greatly reduces racial disparities and captures a more fundamental
meaning of merit which should drive admission decisions.”); Jonathan Feingold,
Racing Towards Color-Blindness: Stereotype Threat and the Myth of Meritocracy,
3 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 231, 233 (2011) (“In the presence of
stereotype threat, the LSAT is a defective tool that prevents otherwise qualified
Black and Latino/a students from displaying their true talent. Understood in this way,
reliance on the LSAT contravenes fair measures and deprives Black and Latino/a
applicants of the individualized review our Constitution demands.”).
105

See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State
Anti-Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1109 (2009) (“Generally,
there are two major categories of opposing theories explaining the racial gap in SAT
scores: ‘minority-deficiency’ theories and ‘test-deficiency’ theories.”)
See Jonathan P. Feingold, “All (Poor) Lives Matter”: How Class-Not-Race Logic
Reinscribes Race and Class Privilege, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 47 (2020)
(identifying how standard admissions policies tend to benefit class-privileged white
applicants).
106

107

Advocates could borrow from Professors Jerry Kang and Mazharin Banaji, who
defended affirmative action as a “fair measure” of applicant talent and potential. See
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1067–68 (2006) (“‘Fair’ connotes the
moral intuition that being fair involves an absence of unwarranted discrimination, by
which we mean unjustified social category-contingent behavior. The term also
connotes accuracy in assessment. ‘Measure’ has the double meaning as well:
measurement and an intervention intentionally taken to solve a problem.”).
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by race—even when it is facially race-neutral. And affirmative action, by
reducing the relevance of race, is no preference at all.
Harvard and UNC have failed to make this basic turn. Instead, they
continue to justify their own policies as racial preferences (or “tips”)
necessary to ensure student body diversity. This framing undercuts the
strongest case for affirmative action—that is, as necessary antidiscrimination that counters existing racial preferences for white applicants).
It also contradicts Harvard and UNC’s public statements recognizing that
structural forms of racism continue to pervade American society and their
own campuses.108 Among other consequences, it feeds the narrative that
racial disparities pre-affirmative action reflect actual differences in academic
talent and potential—not, for example, a range of social (dis)advantages tied
to a students’ race and class. In effect, Harvard and UNC defend their own
policies on colorblind terms that mask the many ways race operates within
standard, facially race-neutral facets of their own admissions regimes. This,
in turn, undermines the universities’ ability to defend race-conscious
admissions as modest attempts to mitigate unearned race-class advantages
that benefit wealthy white students over more talented and deserving students
from marginalized racial groups.

II. EXPLAINING AMBIVALENCE
Harvard and UNC, like other elite universities, remain ambivalent
affirmative action advocates. In this Part, I unpack three sources of this
ambivalence: (a) commitment gaps, (b) perceived conflicts of interest, and
(c) risk aversion. In total, these elements coalesce to disincentivize elite
institutions from zealously defending their own policies.
This overview identifies key forces that inform institutional
decisionmaking. I am not, however, making a causal claim regarding a
specific university’s affirmative action defense. Rather, my goal is to surface
features common to elite universities that help to explain why formal

108

See, e.g., Message from Harvard President Lawrence S. Bacow, Harvard & The
Legacy
of
Slavery
(Apr.
26,
2022),
https://legacyofslavery.harvard.edu/about/aboutmessage-from-president (“But our
recent progress must not obscure the reality of our past—or the continuing effects of
the past on the present. The legacy of slavery, including the persistence of both overt
and subtle discrimination against people of color, continues to influence the world in
the form of disparities in education, health, wealth, income, social mobility, and
almost any other metric we might use to measure equality.”).
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advocates continue to avoid—if not resist—facts and theories that would
anchor a more compelling case for affirmative action.

A. Commitment Gaps
...The overt racists are united, coordinated & relentless in their efforts
to completely undo the Civil Rights Movement and doom us to another
100 years at least of brutal racial oppression. White liberals aren’t
nearly as committed to stopping them...109
Bree Newsome, whose Tweet appears above, gained national attention
after she scaled South Carolina’s state house and removed a Confederate
flag.110 Her Tweet gestured to a then-nascent campaign of backlash that
followed the nation’s turn toward antiracism after the global uprising for
racial justice in 2020.111 In her Tweet, Newsome juxtaposed the regressive
forces behind that campaign (and their unqualified commitments to roll back
civil rights) with white liberals (and their often fickle commitment to civil
rights). This contrast—uncompromised segregationists on the one hand;

109

Bree Newsome (@BreeNewsome), TWITTER (June 1, 2021, 8:53AM),
https://twitter.com/BreeNewsome/status/1399891938640343040?s=20.
110

Newsome’s Tweet tracks a longstanding critique of white liberals—particularly
political leaders—as more invested in white reconciliation than with protecting the
right of racial minorities. Martin Luther King, Jr. offered similar sentiment in his
1963
Letter
from
Birmingham
Jail,
http://okra.stanford.edu/transcription/document_images/undecided/630416019.pdf:
First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the
white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro’s great
stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen’s Council-er or the Ku
Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to “order” than to justice; who
prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the
presence of justice; who constantly says: “I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot
agree with your methods of direct action”; who paternalistically believes he can set the
timetable for another man’s freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who
constantly advises the Negro to wait for a “more convenient season.” Shallow understanding
from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of
ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection.
111

See Hakeem Jefferson & Victor Ray, White Backlash Is a Type of Racial
Reckoning,
Too,
FiveThirtyEight
(Jan.
6,
2022),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/white-backlash-is-a-type-of-racial-reckoningtoo/ (“And the racial reckoning of this moment — one characterized by white
backlash to a perceived loss of power and status — seems poised to be much more
consequential.”).
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compromising integrationists on the other—neatly captures the first source
of affirmative action ambivalence: commitment gaps.
Taking elite universities as the baseline, one can measure commitment
gaps against at least two discrete comparators. To one side, elite schools have
never valued racially inclusive campuses (or affirmative action, as a means
to that end) as much as third parties stakeholders have valued racial inclusion
(or the tools to effectuate it).112 These stakeholders include, as an example,
the students and civil rights groups that routinely seek intervention in
affirmative action litigation.113 To the other side, elite schools have never
valued preserving affirmative action as much as regressive activists have
valued eliminating affirmative action.114 To concretize this latter gap, it is
helpful to juxtapose “segregationist” universities’ commitment to
segregation with “integrationist” universities’ commitment to integration. I
turn here now.

1. Uncompromising Segregationists
Here, I employ the term “segregationist” to refer to universities that
engaged in de jure racial segregation before Brown and resisted integration
post-Brown. Desegregation resistance was swift and enduring.115 The
Southern Manifesto, which 101 of 128 Southern Congressman signed in the

112

See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene at 12, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev’d sub nom Grutter v. Bollinger,
188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (No. CV-75231-DT) (“While the University’s continued
existence or prosperity would not be jeopardized by a ruling for Plaintiffs in this
case, Applicants face a serious risk of being excluded from educational opportunity
at the University.”).
See id. (“Applicants’ interest, by contrast, is not in defending any particular
admissions program implemented by the University, but rather in preserving access
for African-American and Latino students and in maintaining a racially and
ethnically diverse student body.”).
113

114

The special interests funding anti-affirmative action litigation have also
underwritten a range of political and legal efforts to roll back basic civil rights gains
across sectors of American life. See Anemona Hartocollis, He Took on the Voting
Rights Act and Won. Now He’s Taking on Harvard., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/19/us/affirmative-action-lawsuits.html.
115

Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
346 (1975). To a meaningful degree, this resistance never ended. See Latoya Baldwin
Clark, Education as Property, 105 VA. L. REV. 397 (2019).
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wake of Brown, embodies this commitment.116 In this statement, the southern
lawmakers decried the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown “a clear judicial
abuse of power” and encouraged states to resist its mandate.117 Although
subject to varying interpretations, the Manifesto represented a unified front
against Brown’s promise and potential.118 As Justin Driver describes,
“drafters of the Manifesto aimed to preserve the prevailing racial order,
which at bottom was animated by an ideology that the Supreme Court has
accurately labeled ‘White Supremacy,’ the bedrock belief that whites are
better than blacks.”119
The Manifesto’s spirit of defiance foreshadowed decades of
desegregation defiance that spanned the country. This anti-integration
campaign took on the moniker of “Massive Resistance”—a term Virginia
Senator Harry Byrd employed to capture the segregationist resolve following
Brown.120 North Carolina’s efforts to evade meaningful integration is
instructive. In form and rhetoric, North Carolina engaged in a strategy of
calculated “moderation.”121 Unlike other Southern states—that openly defied

116

For a detailed review of the Southern Manifesto, see Justin Driver, Supremacies
and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1071 (2014) (“The true meaning
of the Manifesto was to make defiance of the Supreme Court and the Constitution
socially acceptable in the South—to give resistance to the law the approval of the
Southern Establishment.”).
117

Southern
Manifesto
on
Integration
(March
12,
1956),
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/sources_document2.html.
See Driver, supra note 122, at 1079 (“In the end, the bid for regional unity proved
remarkably successful, as the overwhelming majority of the South's congressional
delegation signed the Manifesto.”).
118

119

Id.

120

See
Massive
Resistance,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
VIRGINIA,
https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/massive-resistance/ (last visited Jan. 24,
2022); Byrd Calls for ‘Massive’ Resistance to Integration, NEWPORT NEWS DAILY
PRESS (Feb. 26, 1956) (quoting Harry Byrd) (“If we can organize the Southern States
for massive resistance to this order, I think that in time the rest of the country will
realize that racial integration is not going to happen in the South.”).
121

See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South
During the Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92, 98 (1994) (“[T]he concept
of ‘moderation’ in the post-Brown South, particularly in North Carolina, was a
malleable concept, skillfully used to deflect widespread pupil integration. Resistance
to Brown was far more spectacular in the defiant southern states such as Virginia and
Louisiana, but equally effective in states such as North Carolina that understood the
value of tokenism and appeals to moderation.”).
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federal desegregation orders—North Carolina’s white elite adopted
privileged token representation and moderated its rhetoric.122 Even preBrown, the legislature had opened an all-Black law school so that it could,
consistent with evolving legal decisions, exclude Black students from its
flagship schools.123
Post-Brown, moderation proved an effective strategy.124 As late as 1969,
fifteen years after Brown and five years after Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,125 UNC remained—in substance if not form—an allwhite institution.126 In fact, through the entire 1970s, UNC was embroiled in
federal litigation for failing to remedy its history of segregation.127 That

122

See Braxton Craven, Legal and Moral Aspects of the Lunch Counter Protests,
CHAPEL HILL WKLY., Apr. 28, 1960 at 1B (“The choice is not between segregation
and integration; it is between some integration and total integration. . . . [If we resist
all integration], it is a foregone conclusion that the winner will be total integration,
or that the schools will be closed. . . . Token integration . . . will save the state and
save the schools. . . . This is moderation.”).
Donna L. Nixon, The Integration of UNC-Chapel Hill – Law School First, 97
N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1756–57 (2019) (“The unaccredited North Carolina College
School of Law was the only institution open to African Americans for enrollment. It
was specifically created by the state in 1939 to avoid integrating Carolina Law, the
state's flagship university, and the only public law school at the time. The North
Carolina legislature acted swiftly to establish the North Carolina College School of
Law, situated approximately eleven miles from UNC-Chapel Hill, after the United
States Supreme Court decided Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, a 1938 case against
the University of Missouri School of Law.”); Irving Joyner, Pimping Brown v. Board
of Education: The Destruction of African-American Schools and the Mis-Education
of African-American Students, 35 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 160, 169 (2013) (“Legislators
established the law school to protect the University of North Carolina Law School
from a Missouri ex rel. Gaines inspired lawsuit by the NAACP on the grounds that
the state did not have a law school African-Americans could attend.”).
123

124

See Douglas, supra note 127, at 155.

125

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for entities receiving
federal funding to engage in racial discriminate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (“No
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”)
126

See id.

127

In 1969, the Nixon administration responded by naming North Carolina among
ten states ordered to develop desegregation plans—an affirmative obligation under
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litigation continued until 1981, when the university entered into a favorable
settlement with a sympathetic Reagan administration.128 The NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, which played a central role in the preceding litigation,
challenged the consent decree as deficient to realize meaningful
desegregation.129 David S. Tatel, who led the federal agency that pushed for
desegregation during the Carter administration, offered a similar critique:
“This settlement doesn’t read like a desegregation plan. It reads like a joint
U.S.-North Carolina defense of everything the system did.”130
In certain respects, the most entrenched desegregation resistance
occurred beyond the confines of higher education. Similar to recent
campaigns targeting antiracism and Critical Race Theory in K-12 settings,
much of the most backlash to federal integration mandates occurred in
primary and secondary schools. Across the country, from the deep South to
the far North, children of color (often Black) integrating white schools often
required armed escort to navigate harassment, intimidation, and actual
violence.131 Rarely did such mistreatment cease at the schoolhouse door.132
federal law. See History Department of N.C. State Univ., Fluctuating Commitment,
N.C.
STATE
UNIV.:
THE
STATE
OF
HISTORY,
https://soh.omeka.chass.ncsu.edu/exhibits/show/colorline-hew/hewcommitment.
128

See Charles R. Babcock, U.S. Accepted Desegregation Plan Once Rejected for
N.C.
Colleges,
WASH.
POST
(July
11,
1981),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/07/11/us-accepteddesegregation-plan-once-rejected-for-nc-colleges/3e4c542b-40b8-405f-8cc9a46952035b0f/.
129

See David W. Bishop, The Consent Decree Between the University of North
Carolina System and the U.S. Department of Education, 1981-82, 52 J. NEGRO EDU.
350, 358-60 (1983).
130

Babcock, supra note 134.

In 1967, the US Commission on Civil Rights observed that “violence against
Negroes continues to be a deterrent to school desegregation.” Resistance to School
Desegregation, EQUAL JUST. INSTITUTE, (Mar. 1, 2014), https://eji.org/news/historyracial-injustice-resistance-to-school-desegregation/. See also Mamie Hassell, The
Clinton 12: The Integration Story of Tennessee’s Public School, Tennessee State
Museum (July 28, 2020), https://tnmuseum.org/junior-curators/posts/the-clinton-12the-integration-story-of-tennessees-public-schools?locale=en_us (describing the
“angry mobs and members of the Ku Klux Klan” who protested the integration of
Clinton, TN’s high school in 1956).
131

See Derrick A. Bell, Waiting on the Promise of “Brown”, 39 LAW & CONT.
PROBLEMS 341, 372 (1975) (“The violent response of the white Bostonians was
indefensible, but predictable, given their conviction that black students will
132
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One example from Mansfield, Texas, a small farming town of 1500 residents,
captures this broader phenomenon:
When the school board of Mansfield, Texas, a farming town of 1500
people, admitted 12 Black students to all-white Mansfield High
School, white residents took to the streets in protest. On August 30,
1956, the first day of school, mobs of white pro-segregationists
patrolled the streets with guns and other weapons to prevent Black
children from registering.
The mob hung an African American effigy at the top of the school’s
flagpole and set it on fire. Attached to each pant leg was a sign. One
read, “This Negro tried to enter a white school. This would be a terrible
way to die,” and the other read, “Stay away, n*ggers.”
A second effigy was hung on the front of the school building. Soon
afterward, the Mansfield School Board voted to “exhaust all legal
remedies to delay segregation.”
In December 1956, the United States Supreme Court ordered the
Mansfield school district to integrate immediately, but Mansfield
public schools did not officially desegregate until 1965.133
The foregoing overview of desegregation resistance has been far from
comprehensive.134 Still, it points to a well-documented legacy of public and
private efforts to fight racial integration across the country.135 I invoke this
history, in large part, to juxtapose (a) the often-uncompromising
deteriorate already inferior schools and their knowledge that the well-to-do suburbs
are exempt from the problems they face.”).
133

See Equal Justice Institute, supra note 137.

134

For a more comprehensive review of the anti-integration campaign that became
known
as
Massive
Resistance,
see
Massive
Resistance,
Segregation
in
America,
EQUAL
JUSTICE
INSTITUTE,
https://segregationinamerica.eji.org/report/massive-resistance.html.
135

Desegregation resistance remains a reality across the country. As a contemporary
analogue, anti-antiracist backlash appears to have occurred with greatest frequency
in school districts experiencing above-average levels of demographic shift. See Tyler
Kingkade & Nigel Chiwaya, Schools facing critical race theory battles diversifying
rapidly,
analysis
finds,
NBC
News
(Sept.
13,
2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/schools-facing-critical-race-theorybattles-are-diversifying-rapidly-analysis-n1278834 (“An NBC News analysis of 33
cities and counties where school districts have faced rancor over equity initiatives
this year in at least three recent school board meetings finds that each has become
less white over the last 25 years, reflecting a national trend.”).
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commitments of segregationist universities to racial exclusion against (b) the
often-yielding commitments of integrationist universities to racial inclusion.
To further concretize this gap, I now turn to the University of California, an
integrationist university136 that has long exhibited ambivalence toward
affirmative action and racial inclusion.

2. Compromising Integrationists
In many respects, the University of California (“UC”) offers a
paradigmatic example of what I term an “integrationist” university. Even
recognizing the range of often-competing viewpoints that comprise a
complex institution like UC, university leaders have long championed the
value of racial diversity and inclusion. 137 And albeit earnest, UC’s
commitments to racial integration (and race-conscious admissions as a means
to that end) have been far from unyielding. To flesh out this story, I highlight
two defining moments in UC history: (1) the Bakke litigation in the 1970s
and (2) the passage of Regents Special Policy 1 (“SP-1”) and Proposition 209
in the mid-1990s.

(1) The Bakke Litigation
Regents of California v. Bakke comprised the Supreme Court’s first
substantive engagement with affirmative action. Although the basic facts are
known to most law professors and students, most details are not.

As noted above, I use the term “integrationist” university to describe institutions
that employ race-conscious admissions and express public commitments to racial
inclusion on their campus.
136

137

UC is a massive institution spanning 9 academic campuses See The Parts of UC,
UNIV. CAL., https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/uc-system/parts-of-uc. Treating
UC as a single entity inevitably obscures and flattens this complexity, which includes
competing viewpoints about any policy or proposal. For this reason, the following
analysis lacks nuance that might otherwise be desirable. Where possible, I
disentangle distinct institutional interests and actors to tell a more nuanced story. But
the inherent diversity of perspectives at a university like this is likely to mute
institutional support for a policy as controversial as affirmative action. See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene at 10, Gratz v. Bollinger,
183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev’d sub nom Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394
(6th Cir. 1999) (No. CV-75231-DT) (“[T]he University’s vigor in defending its
admissions programs might be affected by real differences among faculty, members
of the Board of Regents, and other members of the University community regarding
the desirability of race-conscious admissions.”).
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In 1968, UC Davis opened its Medical School (“Davis”) and welcomed
an entering class of 50 students. That year, Davis—a public medical school—
admitted 47 white students and 3 Asian students. It admitted zero Black,
Latinx, or American Indian students. By 1971, Davis expanded to 100
students and “devised a special admissions program to increase the
representation of ‘disadvantaged’ students in each” class.138 That “Task
Force” program involved a parallel admissions track for “economically
and/or educationally disadvantaged” students.139 Through this separate track,
which was open to any disadvantaged student, Davis admitted 63 students of
color between 1971-1974; only 44 students of color gained entry via the
standard track during those same years.140
Allan Bakke, the plaintiff, applied to Davis in 1973 and 1974. He was
rejected on both occasions.141 After the second rejection, Bakke—who is
white—sued Davis.142 Among other claims, Bakke alleged that Davis,
because it employed a distinct admissions process for applicants from
disadvantaged backgrounds, violated his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.143 In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court
found for Bakke and struck down Davis’s admissions policies.144
For purposes of this Article, the Supreme Court’s holding is not the
relevant part of this story. Rather, UC’s posture throughout the litigation—

138

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272 (1978). For a more detailed
summary of the special admissions program, including questions that appeared on
Davis’ application form, see Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 38-41
(1976), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
139

See id. at 275.

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-76 (“From the year of the increase in class size—
1971—through 1974, the special program resulted in the admission of 21 black
students, 30 Mexican-Americans, and 12 Asians, for a total of 63 minority students.
Over the same period, the regular admissions program produced 1 black, 6 MexicanAmericans, and 37 Asians, for a total of 44 minority students.”).
140

141

See Joel Dreyfuss & Charles Lawrence III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF
INEQUALITY 16-30 (1979) (outlining Bakke’s medical school application history).
142

See id.

143

See Regents of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1978) (“[Bakke] alleged that
the Medical School’s special admissions program operated to exclude him from the
school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the California Constitution, and . . . Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
144

See id. at 319-20.
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particularly during the initial state court proceedings—illustrates the
ambivalence this integrationist institution held toward affirmative action.145
For much of the litigation, UC showed more interest in obtaining clarity
about the constitutional bounds of race-conscious admissions than in
preserving its medical school’s admissions scheme.146 On the one hand, the
desire for judicial guidance makes sense. In the mid-1970s, a decade after
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court had yet to opine on
the constitutionality of remedial race-conscious admissions practices.147 But
one can both desire legal clarity and exhibit an unwavering commitment to a
specific outcome—e.g., racial inclusion. This was, after all, an opportunity
for UC to help shape the Supreme Court’s antidiscrimination jurisprudence
as it applied to race-conscious admissions and racial remedies more broadly.
And yet, UC exhibited no such commitment—particularly during early
stages of litigation. As one example, UC introduced no evidence about “past

145

It is important to recognize that as early as the 1970s, Davis and the broader UC
system took steps to integrate its campuses. Those efforts include the voluntary raceconscious admissions policy that Bakke challenged in Regents of UC v. Bakke.
Accordingly, I am not arguing that UC broadly, and the Davis Medical School more
narrowly, valued racial inclusion. Rather, my argument is that Davis valued racial
inclusion less than segregationist institutions valued racial exclusion. As I outline
here, that commitment gap creates a structural dynamic that continues to undermine
the case for affirmative action in the court of law and the court of public opinion.
146

See Dreyfuss & Lawrence, supra note 131 at 92 (quoting Donald Reidhaar, then
Chief UC System Legal Counsel, as stating: “It is far more important for the
University to obtain the most authoritative decision possible of the legality of its
admissions process than to argue over whether Mr. Bakke would or would not have
been admitted in the absence of the special admissions program.”).
Here, I use “remedial” to broadly capture race-conscious admissions policies
designed to increase the representation of students from historically excluded racial
groups. Prior to Bakke, the Supreme Court had confronted the constitutionality of
race-conscious admissions on only one other occasion. See DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974). That case, however, produced no substantive law because
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded on mootness grounds. See id. at 319-20
(“Because the petitioner will complete his law school studies at the end of the term
for which he has now registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on
the merits of this litigation, we conclude that the Court cannot, consistently with the
limitations of Art. III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional
issues tendered by the parties.”).
147
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and present racial discrimination in the California public school system.”148
Nor did UC marshal facts or theories to advance the proposition that “the
Davis medical school itself had discriminated against minority applicants”
when it opened in 1968.149 In fact, UC agreed to forgo a trial altogether—and
thereby reduced the record to evidence presented during a single pre-trial
hearing.150 As a result, the record lacked evidence that could have concretized
and quantified the claim that Davis needed to consider race (and class) to
counter the race (and class) advantages that white applicants enjoyed in the
school’s standard process.151 But rather than mount the most compelling case
for its own policy, the university appeared to privilege a speedy resolution—

148

See Bell, supra note 20 at 6. Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River:
A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928,
955 (2001) (“For example, when Grutter v. Bollinger . . . was first filed, many people
encouraged the University to admit and carefully document its own historical and
contemporary discrimination against African-Americans and other minority
students.”).
149

Bell, supra note 20 at 6. Bell notes that these are the precise arguments third party
stakeholders were prepared to advance were they not sidelined throughout the
litigation. See id. at 6-7 (“If the case had been remanded for a full trial, impressive
evidence would have been introduced indicated that the Medical College Admission
Test (MCAT) is not a valid indicator of minority performance in medical school, and
that Davis therefore was justified in attempting to compensate for the test’s
antiminority bias.”). Perhaps most striking, UC failed to even provide evidence for
the theories it advanced. See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (“Petitioner
identifies, as another purpose of its program, improving the delivery of health-care
services to communities currently underserved. It may be assumed that in some
situations a State’s interest in facilitating the health care of its citizens is sufficiently
compelling to support the use of a suspect classification. But there is virtually no
evidence in the record indicating that petitioner's special admissions program is
either needed or geared to promote that goal.”) (emphasis added).
150

See Dreyfuss & Lawrence, supra note 131 at 59.

See Bell, supra note 20 at 7 n.9 (citing cases and noting that “[f]ederal and state
courts have found racial discrimination in California’s public school system”). In
other words, Davis could have framed its dual admissions process as necessary antidiscrimination that mitigated past and present race- and class-advantages. Before the
trial court, UC characterized its consideration of race as a “preference.” See Dreyfuss
& Lawrence, supra note 131 at 51 (“The question is not whether preference should
be allowed; they are basic to the admissions process. The question is whether the
Constitution is to deny members of minority groups from disadvantaged
backgrounds the kind of preference which is routinely granted to a myriad other
individuals and groups.”).
151
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even if that risked curtailing or eliminating Davis’ still-nascent efforts to
integrate its campus.152
Throughout the trial court proceedings, UC also failed to affirmatively
contest Bakke’s framing of its admissions system.153 From his initial
complaint, Bakke argued that Davis employed a “quota of 16 percent” and
that “under this admission program racial majority and minority applicants
went through separate segregated admission procedures with separate
standards for admissions.”154 Bakke further alleged that this process “resulted
See Dreyfuss & Lawrence, supra note 131 at 32 (“The lack of a trial in Bakke
remains a major criticism of the handling of the case by attorneys for the [UC]. In
addition, a number of important omissions and concessions by attorneys for the
University have muddied the defense all the way to the [Supreme Court]. . . . The
facts indicate that the university lawyers were hampered not so much by a lack of
lawyering skills as by the competing concerns of their client and an ambivalence
about issues central to the case.”); id. at 66 (“It was not difficult to conclude that a
group of white male attorneys would see the Bakke case as a simple matter of law
and an opportunity to settle once and for all a practice that was generating
considerable public resistance as the mood of the nation changed . . .”). In other
affirmative action litigation, universities have valued efficiency over investing
resources and time necessary to mount the most forceful case for affirmative action.
See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1269–70 (11th Cir.
2001) (“Intervenors also contend that additional time should have been afforded so
that they could have developed a record supporting a remedial justification for
UGA's consideration of race. As Intervenors see it, whether UGA has eliminated the
vestiges of past discrimination is still an open question. But none of the parties—or
for that matter the federal government—accepts that claim. Moreover, the issue
raised by Intervenors would have greatly expanded the scope and burden of the case,
and quite probably have necessitated further delays beyond those ostensibly sought
by the Intervenors. Especially given the significance of the lawsuit, and critical
importance to UGA and its future freshman applicants of resolving this matter as
soon as possible, the district court had ample grounds for declining to modify or halt
proceedings.”).
152

153

See Dreyfuss & Lawrence, supra note 131 at 41.

154

See id. at 37-38. In his brief before the California Supreme Court, Bakke
characterized Davis’s dual admissions program as a “preferential racial quota” that
unlawfully discriminated against white applicants. See Brief for Respondent, at 2728, Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811), 1977 WL
187993, at *i. (“There are 100 places in the first year class at the Davis Medical
School. Under normal circumstances, Allan Bakke would be eligible to compete for
all of those places. In this case, however, petitioner has formally adopted a
preferential racial quota and has set aside 16 of the places for members of designated
racial and ethnic minority groups. In so doing, petitioner has prevented Bakke, solely
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in the admission of minority applicants less qualified than plaintiff” and other
rejected applicants.155 This framing, which conjured the image of a rigid and
racially exclusionary process, mischaracterized Davis’s actual practices.156
In a 1978 review of the case, journalist Joel Dreyfuss and professor
Charles Lawrence lamented that “[e]arly in the case the university virtually
conceded that a quota was in operation.”157 To begin, the university provided
inaccurate information about its own program. Specifically, UC submitted
evidence indicating that in the two years Bakke applied, Davis had admitted
sixteen students through the Task Force program.158 In fact, admissions
records revealed that in 1974, Davis admitted only fifteen students through
the Task Force. This discrepancy, albeit minor, contradicted the
characterization of a rigid quota and the claim that Davis admitted
“unqualified minority applicants.”159
Exacerbating inaccurate numbers, Davis omitted key facts about its
program. This included testimony that the Task Force had considered (but
did not admit) white students and had excluded middle-class students of
color.160 Moreover, Davis never disclosed that the dean often intervened on
behalf of well-connected, but academically unimpressive, white

because of his race, from competing for the 16 quota places. Petitioner does not
dispute this fact and, under the burden of proof rule announced by the California
Supreme Court, concedes that it cannot refute Bakke's claim that he would have been
admitted to the medical school had there been no quota.”).
155

See Complaint, [FULL CITE]

156

See Dreyfuss & Lawrence, supra note 131 at 41-43.

157

See id. at 41.

158

See id.

159

See id.

160

The controlling criteria was student disadvantage, not student race. See id. at 4142 (citing testimony that “white applicants were interviewed . . . [but] were not
admitted because they failed to meet the economic and social qualifications applied
to minority applicants or because they indicated no plans to practice in underserved
or ghetto areas”). These details arose in the state court proceedings, but the California
Supreme Court appeared to discredit those facts. See Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of
California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 44 (1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(“The trial court found that although the special admission program purports to be
open to ‘educationally or economically disadvantaged’ students, and although in
1973 and 1974 some applications for the program were received from members of
the white race, only minority students had been admitted under the program since its
inception, and members of the white race were barred from participation.”).
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applicants.161 As Dreyfuss and Lawrence explain, this undisclosed behavior
reflected an “extremely subjective and arbitrary admissions” processes that
benefitted otherwise unqualified white and wealthy applicants. In other
words, Davis never introduced evidence that could have undercut Bakke’s
core framing that a rigid quota unfairly harmed innocent white applicants like
himself.162 Whether or not dispositive, Davis’s initial defense compromised
its ability to counter predictable lines of attack.163
Bakke also argued that he would have been admitted but for the “special
admissions” track. After initially contesting this claim, Davis later withdrew
any attempt to prove that Bakke would have been rejected even absent its
special admissions program.164 To onlooking stakeholders, this decision
reaffirmed that UC was more interested in obtaining legal clarity than
defending its right to employ a modest affirmative action policy.165

161

See id. at 42 (referencing reports that the Dean was admitted as many as five such
applicants each year).
162

After the trial court proceedings, UC took a more aggressive stand against
Bakke’s core framing. But the damage had been done; the narrative of a rigid quota
delimited by race dominated judicial and public discourse. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at
289 (“[T]he parties fight a sharp preliminary action over the proper characterization
of the special admissions program. Petitioner prefers to view it as establishing a
‘goal’ of minority representation in the Medical School. Respondent, echoing the
courts below, labels it a racial quota.”).
Justice Powell, drawing on the California Supreme Court, adopted Bakke’s
characterization of racially segregated admissions tracks. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
288 n.26 (“The court below found—and petitioner does not deny—that white
applicants could not compete for the 16 places reserved solely for the special
admissions program. Both courts below characterized this as a ‘quota’ system.”); see
id. at 289 (“To the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally qualified
minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants could
compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority
applicants. Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn
on the basis of race and ethnic status.”).
163

164

See id. (noting that twelve other medical schools had rejected Bakke and that his
age was likely a factor). See also Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.553 P.2d 1152,
1172 (Cal. 1976), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (“In these
circumstances, we would ordinarily remand . . . for the purpose of determining . . .
whether Bakke would have been admitted . . . absent the special admission program.
However, on appeal the University has conceded that it cannot meet the burden of
proving that the special admission program did not result in Bakke's exclusion.”).
165
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Concerns intensified when UC, after losing before California’s Supreme
court, indicated its desire to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.166
The NAACP moved for a new trial so that the “real parties in interest” could
cure a “wholly adequate and almost non-existent” record.167 The National
Conference of Black Lawyers, for its part, opposed certiorari on the grounds
that UC’s inadequate representation would deprive the Supreme Court of a
“fully developed record in a vigorously litigated case.”168 The Supreme Court
took the case and, affirming the stakeholders’ concerns, held that Davis had
violated Bakke’s constitutional rights.169

(2) SP-1 & Proposition 209
The next moment brings us to the mid-1990s, when UC Regent Ward
Connerly spearheaded the passage of two anti-affirmative action measures in
See Bell, supra note 18 at 5 (“[T]he Regents took the Bakke case to the Supreme
Court over the vehement protests of virtually every minority rights group in the
country. Those groups . . . [concluded that] the inadequate record developed by the
Regents . . . might prove an invitation to disaster.”).
166

167

Petition of National Association of the Advancement of Colored People For
Leave to File Amicus Curiae on Petition For Rehearing and Brief, Bakke v. Regents
of Uni. of Calif., 18 Cal. 3d 34 (1976). See also Petition of NAACP for Leave to File
as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Rehearing at 6, Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. (Bakke I), 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976) (arguing that remand was necessary so
third-party stakeholders could “present evidence on a full range of issues”); id. at 7
(“The real parties in interest in the instant case are Blacks, Mexican-Americans,
Asians, Native Americans and other minority persons who will as a result of this
decision be denied the opportunity to become doctors.”). The California Supreme
Court denied the motion. UC shares some responsibility here as well. The California
Supreme Court initially ordered remand to determine whether Davis would have
admitted Bakke but for the special admissions program. See Joanne Villanueva, The
Power of Procedure: The Critical Role of Minority Intervention in the Wake of Ricci
v. Destefano, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1083, 1115 (2011). UC conceded that it could not
meet this burden—even though multiple factors (including Bakke’s age) suggested
that he would have been denied even if Davis only employed the standard process.
See Dreyfuss & Lawrence, supra note 131 at 90-94.
168

Brief of Amicus Curiae, The National Conference of Black Lawyers, Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), at vii-viii,
http://blackfreedom.proquest.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/bakke9.pdf
(“However, we also have an interest in assuring that so profound a pronouncement
not be obscured, diluted or tainted by the infirmities of a poorly developed record
and a nonadversary case.”).
169

See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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California: Special Policy 1 (SP-1) and Proposition 209. Among other goals,
Connerly and his allies wanted to eliminate a range of race-conscious
practices “at many of the UC campuses that had enabled the racial integration
of even flagship schools like UC-Berkeley and UCLA.”170 Accordingly,
when the above measures passed, UC and its local campuses confronted a
critical question: How to respond? There is little reason to doubt UC’s
general commitment to racial inclusion; at least since the 1960s, UC had
adopted a range of affirmative action policies to integrate its campuses.171
But unlike the segregationists who treated desegregation as an existential
threat, UC treated racial inclusion as a genuine, but far from inviolable,
institutional priority.
On July 20, 1995, the UC Regents adopted Special Policy 1, a measure
designed to eliminate race-based affirmative action across the UC system.172
Throughout debate, proponents of SP-1 linked the measure to Republican
Governor Pete Wilson’s anti-affirmative action crusade—an effort designed
to boost his electoral prospects.173 Fueled by SP-1’s passage, Connerly

170

See Harris, supra note 21, at 1222.

171

See, e.g., Jerome Karabel, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action at the
University of California, 25 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDU. 109 (1999) (outlining rise
and fall of affirmative action programs at UC).
SP-1 banned UC from “us[ing] race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin as criteria for admission to the University or to any program of study.” See
The Regents of the University of California, Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment:
Admissions (SP-1) (July 20, 1995) (rescinded May 16, 2001). SP-1 applied to UC
admissions. The Regents adopted a related measure, SP-2, to eliminate the
consideration of race in employment and contracting. See The Regents of the
University of California, Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment: Employment and
Contracting (SP-2) (July 20, 1995) (rescinded May 16, 2001).
172

173

See The Regents of the University of California, Policy Ensuring Equal
Treatment: Admissions (SP-1) (July 20, 1995) (rescinded May 16, 2001) (“Whereas,
Governor Pete Wilson, on June 1, 1995, issued Executive Order W-124-95 to ‘End
Preferential Treatment and to Promote Individual Opportunity Based on Merit.’”);
Harris, supra note 21, at 1236 (“Former Republican Governor Pete Wilson had been
a moderate supporter of affirmative action as mayor of San Diego and during his first
term in office as governor. However, his position took a turn as the primaries for the
presidential election loomed in sight. He took the lead in the debate over SP-1 and
SP-2 and strenuously lobbied regents who were uncertain or opposed to the
measure.”).

44

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4138470

Draft – do not cite or distribute without author’s permission

organized a coalition of anti-affirmative action forces behind Prop. 209.174
This ballot measure included language that prohibited the state from
“discriminat[ing] against” or “granting preferential treatment” to anyone on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in employment,
education, and contracting.175 Although the words “affirmative action” are
absent from Prop. 209’s text, Connerly was not shy about the underlying
goal: eliminating the formal consideration of race across sectors of public life
in California.176 In 1996, California voters approved Prop. 209177; its
language is now codified in California’s state constitution.178
For present purposes, I am most interested in UC’s reaction to the
passage of SP-1 and Prop. 209. As with UC’s ambivalence during the Bakke
litigation, the university exhibited a far-from-uncompromising commitment
to affirmative action.
To begin, internal fights over SP-1 and Prop. 209 revealed competing
commitments to racial inclusion among UC’s institutional leaders. With
respect to SP-1, the Regents clashed with UC’s administrative leaders and
faculty governing body—both of which endorsed existing race-conscious

174

See California Civil Rights Initiative, Encyclopedia.com (last visited June 1,
2022), https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciencesmagazines/california-civil-rights-initiative (identifying coalitions that Connerly
partnered with during Prop. 209 campaign).
175

Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment by State and Other
Public Entities (“Proposition 209”) (Nov. 1996).
176

See Marcia Barinaga, Backlash Strikes at Affirmative Action Programs, 271
SCIENCE 1908 (1996).
177

See Bill Jones, Statement of the Vote, https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/1996general/sov-complete.pdf.
178

See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
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practices.179 As for Prop. 209, numerous students, staff, faculty, and alumni
were on the frontlines protesting its passage.180
In short, UC was not united against affirmative action. Institutional
leaders were, and remain, committed to a racially integrated campus. But that
is not my claim. I am advancing the more modest point that a commitment
gap has long separated earnest integrationists, on the one hand, and
segregationists, on the other.181 And as intervenors often note, the competing
commitments within integrationist universities is one reason why elite
institutions likes UC are unlikely to mount the most compelling case for their
own race-conscious policies. UNC offers a compelling data point. In the

179

The UC Regents and their values are not static. The current Regents, in marked
contrast to the body that adopted SP-1, support the repeal of Proposition 209. See
Press Release, UC Office of the President, UC Board of Regents Unanimously
Endorses
ACA
5,
Repeal
of
Prop.
209
(June
15,
2020),
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/press-room/uc-board-regents-endorses-aca5-repeal-prop-209. Moreover, in 2001, the Regents rescinded SP-1 and SP-1. Amy
Argonis, Regents Rescind SP-1, SP-2: Chancellor, Students Applaud Decision,
UCDAVIS (May 25, 2001), https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/regents-rescind-sp-1-sp2-chancellor-students-applaud-decision.
180

See California Students Protest Prop. 209, The Harvard Crimson (Nov. 13, 1996),
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1996/11/13/california-students-protest-prop209-pstudents/ (detailing that student protests at several UC campuses resulted in
“more than 40 arrests). Prop. 209 opponents continue to fight for race-conscious
admissions. See Kayleen Carter, Affirmative Action Ballot Measure Fails, But These
Students are Still Fighting to Diversify Their Universities, CAL MATTERS (Nov. 5,
2020),
https://calmatters.org/education/higher-education/college-beat-highereducation/2020/11/affirmative-action-ballot-measure-fails-but-these-students-arestill-fighting-to-diversify-their-universities/; Brandon Yung, Black Students at UC
Berkeley Spearheaded Statewide Initiative to Restore Affirmative Action,
BERKELEYSIDE (July 9, 2020), https://www.berkeleyside.org/2020/07/09/blackstudents-uc-berkeley-diversity-proposition-209-proposition-16-affirmative-actioncalifornia.
181

Since the mid-20th century, segregationist efforts have evolved; they have not
stopped. The endless string of litigation challenging affirmative action and other
policies designed to promote gender and racial inclusion comprises one strand of
these efforts. See Jody Godoy, Activist behind Harvard race case takes aim at Calif.
Board
laws,
REUTERS
(JULY
13,
2021),
HTTPS://WWW.REUTERS.COM/LEGAL/LEGALINDUSTRY/ACTIVIST-BEHIND-HARVARDRACE-CASE-TAKES-AIM-CALIF-BOARD-LAWS-2021-07-13/. A separate strand is
embodied by the resurgent efforts to maintain racially exclusionary K-12 schools.
See Erika Wilson, The New White Flight, 14 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL. 233
(2019).
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same moment that UNC must defend its race-conscious admissions policy
before the Supreme Court, North Carolina’s Republican-dominated
legislature is advancing bills modeled after Prop. 209.182
But to illuminate this commitment gap, it is helpful to explore how UC’s
leadership--which ostensibly supported affirmative action–responded to SP1 and Prop. 209. In short, UC’s pro-affirmative action leadership exhibited
none of the defiance that characterized the Massive Resistance movements
against integration.
For purposes of this Article, I put to the side whether UC leaders could
have—or should have—engaged in civil disobedience or other modes of
extra-legal resistance. Rather, I explore less “radical” steps UC could have
taken to defend affirmative action and racial integration on its campuses.183 I
do so because UC’s failure to undertake modest counterefforts better reveals
the institution’s limited commitment to race-consciousness.
To begin, UC could have legally challenged the force and effect of both
measures. SP-1, for example, was vulnerable to attack on procedural
grounds. The measure abrogated admissions authority formally vested within
UC faculty.184 Moreover, before adopting SP-1, the Regents employed a
procedural process that lacked the level of deliberation common to, and

182

Lynn Bonner, NC Senate Leader wants to ban consideration of race in UNC
admissions and government contracting, THE PULSE (July 14, 2021),
https://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2021/07/14/nc-senate-leader-wants-to-banconsideration-of-race-in-unc-admissions-and-governmentcontracting/#sthash.ZDs0OBlF.dpbs.
Lawrence, supra note 154, at 968–69 (“Short of civil disobedience, what course
can the University take to live out its moral obligation? I want to suggest that the
legal constraints imposed by Proposition 209, the Hopwood decision, and other
provisions prohibiting the use of race in university admissions may offer an
opportunity to move closer to the radical vision of affirmative action, a vision that
adopts the victim perspective and creatively shapes remedies that directly address
remaining conditions of inequality.”).
183

See Harris, supra note 21, at 1236 (“The Regents of the University of California,
the governing body for the university system, delegates the power to make
admissions decisions to the faculty of each campus department. Standing Orders of
the Regents of the University of California, 105.2(a) (2001). Both the SP-1 and
Proposition 209 directly undermined this delegation of authority.”); JOHN A.
DOUGLAS, A BRIEF ON THE EVENTS LEADING TO SP1 (Feb. 28, 1997),
https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/reports/sp1rev.pdf.
184
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arguably required of, UC’s system of shared governance.185 On either
account, UC (or an individual campus) could have taken legal action to
challenge SP-1 as procedural defective.
None did.186 Rather than challenge SP-1, UC campuses jettisoned a
range of racially-attentive practices—including many that, on their face, did
not even appear to violate the measures’ plain language.187 This occurred, in
part, because UC internalized a broad (and contestable) interpretation of
Prop. 209 and SP-1 that called into question a range of race-conscious
practices disconnected from the actual selection of students. .188
Beyond procedural claims, substantive arguments were—and remain—
available to UC. To begin, the university could have argued that Prop. 209
and SP-1 did not prohibit all race-conscious practices. At least two distinct
theories—neither of which UC marshalled—support this claim. First, UC
could have argued that its existing race-conscious practices complied with

See Douglas, supra note 207, at 1 (“[T]he process of consultation leading to SP1
violated the historical pattern of shared governance in which the Regents, the faculty
through the Academic Senate, the administration, and to a lesser extent, students,
share in the responsibility of managing the University of California.”).
185

Following Prop. 209’s adoption, several individuals and groups challenged the
ballot initiative in federal court. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction that
the Ninth Circuit overturned. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692,
698 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Aug. 21,
1997), as amended (Aug. 26, 1997).
186

187

For example, UC eliminated race-conscious outreach efforts designed to increase
the pool of applicants from historically excluded racial groups. See Kate Antonovics
& Ben Backes, Were Minority Students Discouraged from Applying to University of
California Campuses after the Affirmative Action Ban, 8(2) EDUC. FIN. AND POL’Y
208, 213 (2013) (“It is important to recognize that in an effort to minimize the effects
of Prop 209 on minority enrollment, UC campuses increased minority outreach
efforts. These efforts were widely viewed as ineffective, however, at least initially.
Part of the reason for lack of effective programs was that in the immediate aftermath
of Prop 209, there were concerns about whether race-specific outreach (as opposed
to, for example, targeting low income areas) was permitted after Prop 209.”).
See Kim Bojórqeuz, Affirmative Action Failed on California’s Ballot—But
Colleges Commit to Diversity Goals, SACRAMENTO BEE, (Nov. 9, 2020, 5:00 A.M.),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/article246990537.html (quoting UCLA Law professor Laura Gomez) (“Prop
209 says that we can’t use racial preferences in admissions, but it doesn’t say that
we can’t take race into account when it comes to scholarships or recruiting once
they’ve been admitted . . . But the UC legal interpretation has actually not been that
broad ... Why can’t we push that further?”).
188
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Prop. 209. Second, UC could have argued that racial affirmative action was
necessary to maintain federal funding. I discuss each rationale below.
Recall that Prop. 209 does not explicitly prohibit affirmative action.189
Nor does Prop. 209 expressly prohibit universities from considering an
applicant’s race. The text of Prop. 209 mandates that “state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race.”190 By its own terms, Prop. 209 bans only those
race-conscious practices that entail “discriminat[ion]” or “preferential
treatment.”
UC could have, in turn, argued that its race-conscious admissions
practices complied with Prop. 209 because they constituted neither
discrimination nor preferential treatment. What’s the basis for this
argument?191 As noted above, race-conscious admissions tend to intervene
against a backdrop in which standard selection confer race- and class-based
advantages on wealthy white students. Against such a backdrop, raceconsciousness promotes Prop. 209’s textual commands by mitigating racial
(dis)advantages embedded within facially neutral processes. Or put
difference, UC could have defended racial affirmative action as necessary
antidiscrimination—not justifiable discrimination.192
Scholars have raised this precise point. Professor Kimberly WestFaulcon, for example, has highlighted how indeterminate terms like

189

This omission was strategic. Even as California voters adopted Prop. 209, a larger
majority exhibited support for “affirmative action.” Please consider a citation to
support this claim.
Prop. 209’s relevant text, now codified as Section 31 to Art. I of the California
Constitution includes:
190

(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education,
or public contracting. . . .
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which
must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program,
where ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.
191

Historically, many affirmative action advocates have equated affirmative action
with “preferential treatment.” This common framing is pervasive and problematic.
Above all, it treats as an “empirical fact” the contestable claim that affirmative action
confers racial advantage. Carbado, supra note 13 at 1132.
192

See Feingold, supra note 16.
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“preference” are “open to substantial and varying interpretation.”
Accordingly:
[s]tate courts that interpret the antipreference provision of the state’s
anti-affirmative action laws as an absolute ban on the use of racial
classifications, are, in essence, equating the term preference with any
race-conscious action. In contrast, a state court may conclude that
prohibiting racial preferences “does not ban all government action that
is cognizant of race.193
Professor Cheryl Harris advanced a similar argument in the specific
context of Prop. 209’s effect on admissions at UCLA School of Law:
The fact that Proposition 209 eliminated any official preferences based
on race does not mean that racial preferences have been eradicated;
they persist in the form of housing segregation, educational inequality,
and access to societal resources from health care to employment.
Arguably, they also persist in the selection of admissions processes
that rely heavily on a gatekeeping tool—the LSAT—that is known to
produce a racial preference—primarily for whites.194
UC could have advanced a similar rationale to defend its existing
admissions practices. To do so, UC did not need to rely on racially
progressive legal scholars. Instead, the university could have returned to
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion. In an often-overlooked footnote, the
conservative Justice made the following observation:
Racial classifications in admissions conceivably could serve a fifth
purpose . . . : fair appraisal of each individual's academic promise in
the light of some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures. To the
extent that race and ethnic background were considered only to the

193

West-Faulcon, supra note 111, at 1152. Compare Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112
Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating a state affirmative action statutory
scheme applicable to the state lottery and the sale of government bonds based on
equal protection concerns), with Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 164 (Wash. 2003) (“Given th[e] language [of the I-200
voters pamphlet], an average voter would have understood that I-200 does not ban
all affirmative action programs, and would only prohibit the type of affirmative
action we have described as ‘reverse discrimination’ or ‘stacked deck’ programs.”).
194

See also Harris, supra note 21, at 1229.
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extent of curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic
performance, it might be argued that there is no “preference” at all.195
In short, Justice Powell made a simple but critical observation. To
determine whether affirmative action constitutes a “racial preference,” one
must know the function affirmative action performs and the baseline against
which it intervenes. If UC considered applicant race to counter racial
advantages that white applicants enjoyed and racial disadvantages applicants
of color suffered, the policy would, in Justice Powell’s words, confer “no
‘preference’ at all.”196
The empirical case for Justice Powell’s counter-preference framing is
stronger now than in 1996. But even then, robust evidence suggested that
standard measures of merit (e.g., standardized tests) systematically undermeasured the existing talent and potential of students from negatively
stigmatized groups (i.e., Black and Latinx students). To summarize, UC
could have argued that race-consciousness was needed to counter standard
metrics that, albeit facially neutral, granted a race and wealth advantage to
wealthy white applicants over more talented, but less privileged, peers.197
Second, UC could have argued that race-conscious admissions were
necessary to maintain federal funding. Both Prop 209. and SP-1 contained a
“federal funding exception” that exempted “action which must be taken to
establish or maintain eligibility for any funding program, where ineligibility

195

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,, 306 n.43 (1978). It is worth
noting that this rationale appears in a footnote because UC did not defend Davis’s
admissions policy on this basis. See id.
196

Here, I am suggesting that UC had a reasonable basis to claim that Prop. 209
permitted the continued consideration of race. A stronger version of the counterpreference argument would be that Prop. 209 requires race-conscious admissions
when universities rely on measures of merit that confer race and class preferences on
wealthy white students. In other words, because the SAT and ACT are known to
reward inherited race and class privilege, Prop. 209’s ban on “preferential treatment”
could be read to require an affirmative counter-measure.
Lawrence, supra note 154, at 943–44 (“The current Berkeley admissions process
creates a preference for white folks in two very concrete ways: First, it gives bonus
points to high school students who are enrolled in advanced placement courses; and
second, it relies in a determinative and exclusionary way on insignificant differences
in standardized test scores.”). In the face of a global pandemic, litigation targeting
its use of the SAT and ACT, and waning public support for standardized tests, UC
announced plans to eliminate all use of the SAT and ACT beginning in 2025. See
Jose Chavez, UC Agrees to No Longer Consider ACT/SAT Scores in Admissions,
THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2021).
197
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would result in a loss of federal funds.”198 To maintain its existing practices,
UC could have argued that eliminating any consideration of race would have
exposed the university to liability under Title VI or its implementing
regulations.
A limited number of government entities defended the continued use of
certain affirmative action programs on that basis.199 UC did not. As professor
West-Faulcon has described, UC “simply ceased considering race in
admissions.”200
One might presume that UC forewent such an argument because it
lacked supporting evidence. Even were that true in 1996, it was not by 1998,
the year UC abandoned affirmative action across its system.201 That year, the
percentage of Black and Latinx admits plummeted—particularly at UC
Berkeley and UCLA, the UC system’s flagship campuses.202 This decline
accompanied a widening admissions gap between white applicants and
applicants of color. In response, local stakeholders sued UC for over-relying
on the SAT and ACT.203 The plaintiffs argued that Berkeley’s new
admissions practices, which no longer considered race, violated Title VI and
the equal protection clause.204

198

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.

199

See West-Faulcon, supra note 111, at 1092 (“A few government entities,
including the City and County of San Francisco, have attempted to employ [the
federal funding] exception to defend their continued use of affirmative action
policies.”).
Id. (describing how UC’s decision to cease considering race tracked the response
of other universities facing laws similar to Prop. 209).
200

201

See id. at 1094.

See Lawrence, supra note 154, at 942–43 (“Berkeley is the UC system’s most
selective school, and of the 25,796 applicants for the 1999 freshman class, 9,858 had
GPAs of 4.0. But a white applicant with a straight “A” average has a much better
shot at getting into Berkeley than a black, Latino or Filipino applicant with the same
grades.”); Kidder & Rosner, supra note <How the SAT Creates "Built-in
Headwinds> (noting that Berkeley “admitted 28.1% of all applicants (8,438/30,038),
including 31.2% of Whites (2,778/8,892), 20.6% of Latinos (647/3139), and 19.3%
of African Americans (241/1249)”).
202

203

Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief at 4, Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 2, 1999) (No. C.99-0525) [hereinafter Rios Complaint].
204

See American Civil Liberties Union, Minority Students Sue U.C. Berkeley Over
Unfair Admissions Policy, ACLU (Feb. 2, 1999), https://www.aclu.org/press-
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The litigation resurfaced UC’s affirmative action ambivalence. To
begin, Berkeley could have marshaled the same facts and theories that
anchored the Rios complaint to defend its right to maintain race-conscious
admission—even under a Prop. 209 and SP-1 regime. And even if UC was
determined to avoid race-conscious admissions, Berkeley could have
leveraged the evidence of growing inequality to retool its admissions process.
Put differently, if racial integration were a paramount institutional priority,
Berkeley should not have needed third-party plaintiffs to demand that the
university reduce reliance on metrics that predictably advantaged wealthy
white students.205
Berkeley did neither. The day after the lawsuit commenced, Berkeley
Chancellor Robert Berdahl issued the following response: “We have
demonstrated for decades a steadfast resolve to admit and educate students
of all races and ethnicities . . . Our resolve has not changed. But the laws
under which we operate have changed.”206 This statement entailed factual
and normative claims. On the facts, Berdahl attributed the shrinking presence
of Black, Latinx, and Pilipino students to exogenous forces beyond the
university’s control. Specifically, he blamed “the laws”—a reference to Prop.
209 and SP-1.207 In so doing, Berdahl obscured the array of institutional
decisions that produced the outcomes he decried. This includes Berkeley’s
decision to equate academic “merit” with fraught instruments such as the
SAT and ACT.208
The foregoing empirical claim enabled Berdahl to advance a
complementary normative claim. By identifying “bad” laws as the source of
inequality, Berdahl situated Berkeley “on the side of good and right” and

releases/minority-students-sue-uc-berkeley-over-unfair-admissions-policy. For a
deeper discussion of the Berkeley litigation, see Kidder & Rosner, supra note <How
the SAT Creates "Built-in Headwinds>, at 187.
205

UC eliminated legacy preferences after pressure emerged following the passage
of Prop. 209. See Dreyfuss & Lawrence, supra note <THE BAKKE CASE>, at 24.
206

Lawrence, supra note 154, at 948 n.70.

Berkeley is not the only integrationist university that cited “laws” to evade
responsibility for re-segregation. See id. at 954–55 (“It is this implicit participation
in the big lie that allows liberal faculty at Berkeley, UCLA, and Texas to see
themselves as fully committed to affirmative action, even as they throw up their
hands and say, ‘We are helpless’ in the face of Proposition 209 and the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Hopwood.”).
207

208

See Feingold, supra note 110.
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defused accusations of institution racism.209 In other words, Berdahl
identified Berkeley on the side of racial integration by denying how
institutional choices (e.g., preference for high test scores) facilitated the
university’s resegregation.210 I offer this account not to suggest that Berkeley
or its leadership valued a re-segregated campus. To the contrary, the evidence
suggests that Berdahl—as with UC’s general leadership—valued student
body diversity. But that supports my underlying claim: many elite
universities and their leaders hold earnest commitments to racial inclusion.
But those commitments compete with, and are often subordinated beneath, a
range of other institutional interests.211 One can defend how integrationist
universities weigh those competing commitments. But that only reinforces
the commitment gap that separates compromising integrationists and
uncompromising segregationists.

B. (Perceived) Conflicts of Interest
Above, I contrasted integrationist commitments to racial inclusion with
segregationist commitments to racial exclusion. We can think of this interinstitutional dynamic as structural disadvantage that compromises
affirmative action. To deepen that analysis, I now explore intra-institutional
dynamics also disadvantage affirmative action. Specifically, I unpack how
integrationist universities tend to perceive conflicts of interest between racial
inclusion and other institutional priorities. As we witnessed above, when
universities perceived conflicts arise, affirmative action (and racial inclusion)

209

Lawrence, supra note 154, at 948.

210

Moreover, this explanation suggests that Black and Latinx students were
underrepresented because they were underqualified, not because Berkeley privileged
a measure of merit that rewards inherited race and class advantage. See [Rios
complaint]. In so doing, Berdahl reinforced the conservative claim that racial
affirmative action constitutes a departure from “neutrality” and “meritocracy,” as
opposed to a modest mechanism to promote both goals. Even today’s UC leadership,
which supports racial affirmative action, attributed racial disparities to student
deficiencies. See Press Release, UC Office of the President, UC To Continue to
Champion Diverse Student Body Despite Rejection of Proposition 16 (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/press-room/uc-continue-champion-diversestudent-body-despite-rejection-proposition-16 (“Despite the failure of Proposition
16, the University will continue to look for innovative and creative approaches to
further improve the diversity of its student body through outreach to underserved
groups, schools and communities; support for college preparation; and efforts to
close equity gaps among students attaining a UC education.”).
211

See infra Part II.B.
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tends to lose out. Below, to explore this dynamic, outline how racial inclusion
tends to compete with institutional commitments that fall within three
overarching categories: (1) brand goals; (2) budget goals; and (3) risk
aversion.
Before proceeding, two notes are warranted. First, the commitments I
identify below often interact with, and at times bleed into, one another. I do
not mean to suggest otherwise. Still, these categories help to highlight
discrete, if interconnected, elements of university governance that can
heighten affirmative action ambivalence.
Second, in many cases, these “competing” goals do not actually conflict
with affirmative action and racial integration. In other words, universities
often perceive conflicts that do not, in fact, exist. As an analytical matter, it
is important to distinguish between perception and reality. As a practical
matter, the gap between perception and reality matters far less. If a university
perceives a conflict, that perception is likely to shape its behavior even if no
conflict, in fact, exists.

1. Brand Goals
Elite universities care about their institutional reputation—what I
capture here under the rubric of “brand” goals.212 At least two brand goals
can disincentivize a robust affirmative action defense: concerns about
(a) perceived commitments to racial justice and (b) academic prestige. For
brevity, I refer to above brand goals as “antiracist U” and “status,”
respectively. In theory, these goals need not compromise zealous affirmative
action advocacy. In practice, elite universities often perceive a conflict. When
they do, brand concerns prevail.

(1) “Antiracist U”
Most elite universities project a commitment to diversity, social justice,
and antidiscrimination.213 I am not suggesting that such projections

212

See, e.g., Frans Van Vught, Mission Diversity and Reputation in Higher
Education, 21(2) HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y 151 (2008).
213

See, e.g., Anti-Racism: Learning, Healing and Taking Action, HARVARD
COLLEGE, https://dso.college.harvard.edu/anti-racism (last visited Jan. 26, 2022);
Message from the University Office for Diversity and Inclusion: Anti-Black
Violence,
UNC
Office
of
the
Provost
(May
29,
2020),
https://diversity.unc.edu/2020/05/message-from-the-university-office-for-diversityand-inclusion-anti-black-violence/.
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misrepresent actual institutional values.214 That said, commitments to
meaningful inclusion and brand are distinct. An “antiracist” brand can serve
institutional ends even absent actual antiracist commitments. Moreover, in
certain instances, commitments to brand can undermine meaningful projects
of racial reform.
Consider, for example, how an “antiracist” brand can insulate
universities from legitimate critique. To begin, university leaders can
mobilize a successful brand to defuse complaints about institutional
racism.215 We saw this, for example, when then-UC Berkeley Chancellor
Berdahl highlighted the university’s diversity commitments to defuse claims
of institutional racism.216 Second, an antiracist reputation can legitimize
existing distributions of representation, power, and access within a
university.217 As a result, effective communication strategies can preserve the
status quo by muting claims of outgroup derogation and ingroup
favoritism.218
Translated to affirmative action, “antiracist” brand commitments can
incentivize schools to deny or downplay contemporary manifestations of

214

That said, to promote a veneer of racial diversity, multiple universities were
implicated for cropping students of color into official promotional materials. See
Deena Prichep, A Campus More Colorful Than Reality: Beware that College
Brochure, NPR (Dec. 29, 2013).
215

The above referenced episodes involving Cornel West and Nikole Hannah-Jones
reflect how incidents of racial discrimination (actual or perceived) can trigger
widespread public rebuke and condemnation.
See Lawrence, supra note 154, at 948 (characterizing Berdhal’s response as an
attempt to counter claims of racism); see also Dennis Kennedy, Moving Beyond
“Performative” Diversity Commitments, Presidio Graduate School (Dec. 7, 2020)
(“Performative DEII is used to convey a commitment to diversity, equity, and
inclusion; however, often neglects to assign a policy, action, or person designed to
bring about racial equity. Performatives are ritual social practices that are enacted
over time to avoid potential litigation or scrutiny from consumers or stakeholders.”).
216

217

See Dian Squire et al., Institutional Response as Non-Performative: What
University Communications (Don’t) Say About Movements Toward Justice, 2019
REV. HIGHER ED. 109, 113 (2019) (explaining that “institutional rhetoric regarding
a desire for diversity [can] act[] as a way to (re)instill white institutional presence”).
See id. at 129 (arguing that “the purpose of higher education is to maintain the
nationalistic, neoliberal discourse that aims to reinforce the status quo via the process
of minority absorption”); see also Sophia Wolmer, BSU Members Say College’s
Response to #BlackMindsMatter Protest is ‘Reactionary and Performative,’ The
Amherst Student (Apr. 21, 2021).
218
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racial harm.219 If the goal is to project a picture of racial harmony, this
response makes sense. But downplaying evidence of racial harm, particularly
if institutional messaging contradicts students’ lived experience on campus,
can undermine the basic goal of an equal learning environment for all
students. Moreover, by downplaying evidence of racial discrimination on
campus, universities are evading facts that would buttress the case for raceconscious admissions.220
To get more concrete, consider how “antiracist” brand goals could shape
how Harvard approaches ongoing litigation that implicates its race-conscious
admissions practices. From a brand perspective, Harvard can lose in the court
of law but prevail in the court of public opinion. As a formal matter, Harvard
enters the litigation as affirmative action’s formal champion. This posture
furthers Harvard’s ability to position itself on the side of racial justice. To a
significant extent, Harvard can enjoy the accompanying brand benefits even
if it defends its own policy on “lukewarm” terms. And here, brand goals
could incentivize Harvard to avoid evidence that, for example, (a) wealthy
white students continue to enjoy undeserved race-class preferences in
Harvard’s admissions process and (b) students of color continue to confront
racial discrimination on Harvard’s campus.221 Both sets of facts would
support Harvard’s right to consider applicant race. But both risk Harvard’s
“antiracist” brand.
The question becomes: What does Harvard value higher, affirmative
action or its brand? If Harvard prioritizes race-conscious admissions over
brand, we would expect Harvard’s legal defense of affirmative action to
foreground evidence of racial discrimination (against students of color)
within its admissions process and on its campus. Why? Because doing so

By “racial harm,” I mean to include a range of individual and institutional conduct
that denies students of color equal university membership. See Jonathan Feingold,
Hidden in Plain Sight: A More Compelling Case for Diversity, 2019 UTAH L. REV.
59 (2019).
219

220

See Jenkins, supra note 12 (explaining that remedying discrimination attributable
to the university remains a viable defense for race-conscious admissions); see also
Joanne Villanueva, The Power of Procedure: The Critical Role of Minority
Intervention in the Wake of Ricci v. Destefano, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1083, 1115 (2011).
221

For a more detailed analysis concerning the racial (dis)advantages that permeate
standard admissions processes, see Carbado et al., supra note 109 and Feingold,
supra note 16.
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strengthens the constitutional and normative case for race-conscious
admissions.222
In fact, the present lawsuit challenging Harvard’s admissions system
contains these precise allegations.223 Students for Fair Admissions (“SFFA”),
the plaintiff, has alleged that Harvard discriminates against Asian American
applicants. As I detail elsewhere, SFFA has leveraged this narrative of Asian
victimhood to scapegoat affirmative action as the source of anti-Asian bias—
even as SFFA concedes that anti-Asian bias within Harvard’s admissions
process tends to benefit white applicants.224 Harvard could counter this
narrative and strengthen the case for its existing race-conscious policy. But
doing so requires a somewhat counterintuitive response: acknowledge that
facially race-neutral portions of Harvard’s admissions process confer
unearned racial advantages upon white applicants at the expense of similarly
situated Asian applicants .225
Recognizing this evidence of anti-Asian bias serves at least two
purposes. First, by highlighting who benefits from that bias (i.e., white
applicants), Harvard is better positioned to counter SFFA’s unsupported

222

This is a place where the conflict between brand goals and inclusion goals may
be more perception than reality. One could argue that acknowledging and reckoning
with institutional racism—as opposed to denying and avoiding itexists presence—
bolsters the case for affirmative action and promotes an “antiracist” brand. There are
emerging examples of universities taking more proactive steps to reckon with
institutional histories of racism. One example comes from John Hopkins:
Launched in fall 2020, the Hard Histories at Hopkins Project examines the
role that racism and discrimination have played at Johns Hopkins. Blending
research, teaching, public engagement and the creative arts, Hard Histories
aims to engage our broadest communities—at Johns Hopkins and in
Baltimore—in a frank and informed exploration of how racism has been
produced and permitted to persist as part of our structure and our practice.
Through the lessons of hard histories we will chart a way forward. Join us.
Hard Histories at Hopkins, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, https://hardhistory.jhu.edu/
(last visited Aug. 21, 2021).
223

See Jonathan Feingold, SFFA v. Harvard: How Affirmative Action Myths Mask
White Bonus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 707 (2019) (outlining allegations in Harvard
lawsuit).
See id. (identifying that SFFA alleges that several dimensions of Harvard’s
admissions process harms Asian applicants to the benefit of white applicants).
224

Lawrence, supra note 154, at 941 (“[N]either [Bowen or Bok] questions the
validity of standard admissions criteria used at these institutions, nor examines the
ways that these criteria reinforce the effects of societal segregation and racism.”).
225
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claim that affirmative action is the source of anti-Asian bias.226 Second,
Harvard can leverage the evidence to support the case for more affirmative
action—that is, specific steps designed to mitigate the racial advantages that
white students continue to enjoy vis-à-vis their Asian counterparts. 227
In short, Harvard could take seriously allegations of anti-Asian bias.228
Doing so could lead to a more racially inclusive institution and counter
SFFA’s core narrative that affirmative action harms Asian applicants.229
Harvard has not taken this approach. Rather than acknowledge sites of
Asian racial disadvantage, the university disputes all claims of racial
discrimination.230 Brand concerns cannot explain, in full, why Harvard has
foregone a response that would buttress the case for race-conscious
admissions. Still, brand goals help to explain why Harvard continues to deny
and downplay allegations of racial harm (against students of color) within its
admissions process.231

226

See id.

See Feingold, supra note 251, at 732 (“Rather than colorblindness, a responsive
remedy would necessitate the implementation of a race-conscious policy capable of
redressing the specific harm of negative action underlying SFFA's discrimination
claim.”).
227

As one example, SFFA identifies a report from Harvard’s Office of Institutional
Research that suggested Asian applicants might face a race-based penalty in
Harvard’s admissions process. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Reasons in Support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, SFFA v. Harvard 2015. SFFA further
alleged that Harvard prefers white applicants over Asian applicants with similar
academic credentials. See, e.g., id. at 10 (“An Asian-American male applicant with
a 25% chance of admission would see his chance increase to 31.7% if he were
white—even including the biased personal rating.”). Rather than deny the allegation,
Harvard could redouble efforts to mitigate any such racial harm. This could include
a more robust affirmative action policy designed to counter anti-Asian bias
embedded within facially race-neutral elements of Harvard’s admissions process.
See Feingold, supra note 251, at 732.
228

See id. (explaining how Harvard’s defense “fuels the [empirically suspect]
narrative that race-consciousness discriminates against Asian Americans”).
229

230

See Brief for Defendant-Appellee, Students for Fair Admission v. Harvard, 2020
WL 2521577 (C.A. 1)27 (“On the merits, SFFA’s claims fail. As the district court
correctly found, Harvard does not discriminate against Asian-American
applicants.”).
See Harvard’s Response to Motion to Intervene, Students for Fair Admission v.
Harvard, 2015 WL 3833689 (D.Mass.) (opposing intervention and arguing that
231
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As referenced above, “antiracist” brand goals also help to explain why
elite universities fail to foreground evidence that students of color continue
to experience racial bias on campus. In the litigation context, this evidence
would benefit university defendants because it buttresses an existing
rationale for affirmative action: student body diversity.232 The diversity
rationale remains the primary rationale universities invoke to justify raceconscious admissions.233 Still, university defendants—like Harvard and
UNC—tend to marshal thin conceptions of diversity that foreground how
student body diversity promotes more robust conversation in the
classroom—what we might call diversity’s “speech” function.234
But a racially diverse student body does more than promote
conversation in the classroom. When severely under-represented on campus,
students of color tend to face identify-contingent harms that undermine their
basic right to an equal learning environment.235 Racial diversity, in turn,
promotes equality by mitigating those harms—and thereby eliminating a
racial tax that white students never bear. We might call this diversity’s
“equality” function.236 Race-conscious admissions, in turn, emerge as a
potent tool that safeguards the personal and present equality interests of
actual university students.237

evidence of discrimination against students of color is legally irrelevant to Harvard’s
defense).
232

Feingold, supra note 246 (outlining how universities could articulate a more
capacious conception of diversity that centers the experience of students of color).
233

See id.

234

See Jonathan Feingold, Diversity Drift, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 14
(2021); Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1145
(2013) (enumerating diversity benefits embedded in Justice O’Connors Grutter
opinion).
See Feingold, supra note 246 (outlining concept of “equal university
membership”).
235

236

See id. See also Jonathan P. Feingold & Evelyn R. Carter, Eyes Wide Open: What
Social Science Can Tell Us About the Supreme Court's Use of Social Science, 112
NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1707-10 (2018) (describing how an “Elite Student Paradigm”
centers whiteness and imagines students of color—particularly Black students—as
perpetual university outsiders).
237

See id.
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When defending affirmative action, university defendants often gesture
to diversity’s equality benefits.238 But rarely do universities center diversity’s
equality function.239 Neither Harvard nor UNC, for example, have
emphasized how racial diversity constitutes a critical ingredient necessary to
counter institutional dynamics that tend to subject students of color to a
racially hostile learning environment.240
It is unclear why university defendants continue to privilege diversity’s
speech function over its equality function. One explanation is that, by
focusing on speech, Harvard and UNC can position themselves as guardians
of racial diversity without interrogating how racial power continues to
compromise the basic goal of an equal learning environment for all
students.241 In other words, framing diversity in terms of speech (over
equality) enables universities to evade criticism that locates racism in the
institutional environment itself.242 Harvard or UNC, in turn, can champion
diversity without having to publicly engage equality concerns that undercut
an “antiracist” brand.

238

See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 579 U.S. 365, 384 (2016) (noting that the
University of Texas argued that “minority students admitted under the [nonaffirmative action] Hopwood regime experienced feelings of loneliness and
isolation”).
See, e.g., id. at 404 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that UT identified four “more
specific” diversity goals: “demographic parity, classroom diversity, intraracial
diversity, and avoiding racial isolation”).
239

240

To the extent this diversity framing has entered the litigation, it has come from
student intervenors. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows
of Harvard Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39, 44 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015)
(ruling on motion to intervene) (“In addition, the Students claim that they will
argue—and that Harvard is unlikely to argue—that achieving a “critical mass” of
minority students is necessary to reduce the racial isolation of minority students on
campus.”).
241

Charles Lawrence reflected on this dynamic during the Grutter and Gratz
litigation: “It should not surprise use that well-meaning individuals who self-identify
as liberal should be attracted to an argument for racial integration that least threatens
their own privilege.” Lawrence, supra note 154, at 941.
See id. at 953 (“By looking only forward, it avoids any direct admission or
acknowledgement of the institution's past discriminatory practices, even when that
discrimination is de jure and of relatively recent vintage. It makes no effort to inquire
into the ways that current facially neutral practices may have a foreseeable and
unjustifiable discriminatory impact or to account for unconscious bias in their
administration.”).
242
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To summarize, elite universities often perceive a conflict between
maintaining an “antiracist” brand and acknowledging that institutional
arrangements often compromise the present and personal equality interests
of students of color. This perceived conflict, even if more perceived than real,
helps to explain why Harvard and UNC understate racial diversity’s equality
function—even if doing so constraints their ability to defend race-conscious
admissions as necessary antidiscrimination that ensures all students,
regardless of race, can enjoy the full benefits of university membership.

(2) “Status”
A second component of brand is institutional status. Elite universities
hunt academic prestige.243 Derek Bok, a former president of Harvard
University, described the pervasive pursuit for prestige as follows:
[Universities’] most comprehensive objective . . . is academic
distinction, or prestige—an elusive concept that embraces the quality
of the students and the scholarly and scientific reputations of the
faculty.244
Bok surfaces three important features of prestige: (1) universities want
it; (2) the concept is amorphous; and (3) it is broadly understood to capture
the quality of an institution’s students and faculty.
Why do universities hunt prestige? The simple answer is that prestige
yields multiple institutional benefits. To begin, more prestige makes a
university more competitive for sought-after students and faculty.245 Second,
in part due to the above, more prestige increases revenues in the form of
tuition and donor giving.246 In many respects, the relationship between
prestige and the benefits it yields is circular: “[P]restige is both the cause and

243

See Roger L. Geiger, The Competition for High-Ability Students: Universities in
a Key Marketplace, in THE FUTURE OF THE CITY OF INTELLECT: THE CHANGING
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 82, 84 (Steven Brint ed., 2002) (citations omitted) (“The
behavior of universities is frequently described as competition for prestige to achieve
or maintain status.”).
244

DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 159 (2003). See also Geiger, supra note 278, at 87 (referring to
prestige as the “coin of the realm in higher education”).
245

See Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity Double Standard, 89 N.C. L. REV. 945, 959–60
(2011) (“Whether these student and alumni patrons will pay, and how much, is in
large part a function of the university’s prestige . . . .”).
246

See Id.
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the result of getting or having ‘good’ students, ‘good’ faculty, and ample
financial support.”247
Given prestige’s amorphous quality, this construct—albeit highly
valued—can be difficult to assess in a concrete or objective way.248
Historically, prestige has been derived from a school’s reputation in the
relevant community. 249 Today, prestige has become largely synonymous
with a school’s U.S. News & World Report ranking (“Rankings”).250 In 2003,
Professor Lani Guinier described the Ranking’s “as undoubtedly the most
influential voice in judging who ‘wins’ and ‘loses’ in the contest for elite
status.”251 There is little reason to believe this influence has waned. If
anything, the association between Rankings and prestige appears as strong as
ever.252
Accordingly, a rational university that prioritizes maximizing prestige
should prioritize metrics that influence Rankings.253 In practice, this often
translates to over-reliance on standardized test scores (e.g., the SAT and
ACT), which have enjoyed an outsized impact on a university’s ranking.254

247

Geiger, supra note 278, at 87.

248

Kim, supra note 280, at 959–60.

249

That community could be a city, region, country, or subset of similar institutions.

See id. at 960–61 (“[T]he abstract concept of prestige has been de facto
operationalized into the U.S. News rankings.”).
250

251

Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 144 n.126 (2003).
See Kim, supra note 280, at 962–63 (“[Q]uantitative analyses of admissions
trends at colleges and law schools conclusively demonstrate that rankings influence
how many applications a school receives, the academic characteristics of the school’s
applicant pool, the percentage of applicants who are accepted, and the percentage of
accepted students who then matriculate. . . . [T]he higher the institution’s U.S. News
rank, the more likely it will attract students with higher academic credentials and the
more difficult it will be to gain admission.”).
252

253

The Rankings have been subject to widespread critique. See Malcolm Gladwell,
Lord
of
the
Rankings,
REVISIONIST
HIST.
(July
1,
2021),
https://www.pushkin.fm/episode/lord-of-the-rankings/; Bok, supra note 279, at 15960 (“Although the unreliability of [U.S. News’] ratings is notorious, they continue to
have an influence, since nothing else has been devised that provides such regular,
seemingly exact measures of comparative academic quality.”).
The Rankings rely heavily on standardized test scores to compute “the institution's
selectivity which is then used to compute its overall rank.” Kim, supra note 280, at
254
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The relationship between test scores and rank extends to law schools.
Between 2003-2006, for example, of the top 50-ranked law schools, no
school had a median LSAT score lower than a lower ranked school.255 In
other words, as Professor Alex Johnson observed, “none of these other socalled variables are apparently important enough or weighted heavily enough
to cause a school which is superior in all other respects to be ranked higher
than a law school with a higher median LSAT.”256
This reality is not lost on the leaders of American law schools and
universities. Privileging higher test scores produces higher Rankings, which
yield other institutional benefits. But privileging test scores comes with
cost.257 Standardized tests better measure a student’s social capital (including
race and class privilege) than academic promise and potential.258 It should be
no surprise, therefore, that such tests continue to produce racial disparities—
at least as measured by group mean.259 Accordingly, when a school privileges
standardized test scores in admissions, it will predictably exclude many
otherwise talented and qualified students of color—not to mention poor white
students.260 The Rankings, in other words, penalize universities that admit
963–64. Given the waning reliance on standardized test scores at elite universities
(at least in the undergraduate context), it is unclear how rankings will adjust. See
Vivi Lu, Harvard College Suspends Standardized Testing Requirements for Next
Four Years, The Crimson (Dec. 17, 2021).
255

Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions:
The Pernicious Effects of Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 309, 311 n.114 (2006).
256

Id.

See Kim, supra note 280, at 969 (nothing that universities are “forced to choose
between a higher median LSAT score and a more diverse student body”).
257

258

See Dixon-Ramon et al., Race, Poverty and SAT Scores: Modeling the Influences
of Family Income on Black and White High School Students’ SAT Performance, 115
Teachers College Record 2 (2013).
259

See Richard Reeves & Dimitrios Halikias, Race Gaps in SAT Scores Highlight
Inequality and Hinder Upward Mobility, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/race-gaps-in-sat-scores-highlight-inequalityand-hinder-upward-mobility/.
260

See Wendy Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Diversity, 18 S. CAL. REV.
L. & SOC. JUST. 587, 596 (2009) (“Generally (and it is crucial to emphasize these
patterns are measures of central tendency that necessarily obscure variation), men
score higher than women, whites and Asian Americans do better than African
Americans, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, and people living in the
Northeast do better than those from the South. Studies have also found persistent
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meaningful numbers of students from groups that under-perform on
standardized tests.261 Or phrased in the alternative, U.S. News rewards
universities that admit wealthy (often white students) at the expense of
otherwise qualified Black and Latinx students.
These incentives interact with affirmative action in two respects. First,
the Rankings pressure universities to emphasize criteria that increase the
need for a robust affirmative action program.262 The increased need arises
from (a) the race and wealth advantage embedded in such scores and (b) the
foreseeable reduction in student body racial diversity that results.263 Second,
the same prestige goals that drive over-reliance on test scores disincentivize
robust race-consciousness. When a university reduces the exclusionary
effects of standardized tests scores by becoming more race-conscious, it has
the same effects as reducing reliance on SAT: it threatens prestige. Professor
Sung Hui Kim has summarized this dynamic:
Consequently, affirmative action programs that seek to meaningfully
expand the numbers of underrepresented minority groups are at crosspurposes with a university’s ongoing attempts to increase its prestige
standing, driven primarily by standardized test scores, as represented
by its U.S. News ranking.264
Ultimately, in a contest that pits racial inclusion and affirmative action
against prestige, prestige often prevails.265 The priority status that prestige
enjoys helps to explain gaps between institutional rhetoric (e.g., celebrating
racial diversity) and institutional (in)action (e.g., reluctance to jettison
admissions practices that privilege wealthy white applicants).
class effects in standardized testing where students from wealthy or middle-class
families do better than those from working-class or poor families.”).
261

See Gladwell, supra note 288.

See Kim, supra note 280, at 968 (“Sociological interviews of law school
administrators, faculty, and staff involved in the admissions process reveal that the
rankings have sharpened the emphasis on students’ LSAT profiles, which has
impeded their efforts to craft a racially (as well as economically) diverse class of
students.”).
262

263

As I outlined above, beyond group-based disparities, standardized tests tend to
systematically under-measure the existing talent and potential of students from
negatively stereotyped groups. See Carbado, supra note 17.
264

Kim, supra note 280, at 968.

265

Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Inevitable Irrelevance of Affirmative Action
Jurisprudence, 39 J.C. & U.L. 1, 50 (2013) (“Sadly, it seems that today’s postsecondary institutions are not willing to compromise their academic elite status.”).
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At bottom, this dynamic reinforces that elite universities are not
uncompromising affirmative action advocates. At best, they manage
competing influences, constituencies, and priorities—some of which conflict
with (or are perceived to conflict with) affirmative action and racial
integration. At worst, one might contend that attributing ambivalence to these
universities is unduly generous. On the ground, when institutions translate
priorities into action, “other” goals tend to win out at the expense of
affirmative action and racial inclusion more broadly.
In response, a university might insist that the Rankings’ hegemony over
reputation and status limits institutional choice. There is, one might say, a
degree of coercion involved; one cannot simply opt-out of the “rankings
game.” Even if one accepts this argument,266 it provides a justification for
institutional ambivalence. But that just advances my core claim that
structural forces compromise affirmative action’s formal defenders from
marshalling the strongest case for their own policies (and, by extension, racial
integration). Or put differently, if external forces (e.g., U.S. News Rankings)
prohibit elite universities from adequately representing affirmative action,
we might question the outsized role these institutions enjoy when defending
race-conscious admissions—in the court of law and the court of public
opinion.
One final point about prestige is warranted. When elite universities
reward high performance on standardized tests, that behavior reifies a narrow
conception of merit that conflates student talent and potential with test scores.
In other words, when Harvard says that test scores matter more than anything
else, they are telling us what academic excellence entails and who deserves
admission to Harvard. Just this message compromises the case for
affirmative action. To begin, it suggests that any existing racial disparities
are the product of actual differences in merit—not, for example, Harvard’s
decision to privilege metrics that measure social advantage. Moreover, when
Harvard equates test scores with “merit,” it reinforces the contestable claim
that affirmative action constitutes a “racial preference” that intervenes
against an objective and race-neutral baseline.267 In other words, in the same
breath that it defends affirmative action, Harvard endorses talking points

266

Some institutions privilege values other prestige. Rarely, however, are these the
institutions that the public would view as elite or prestigious. See, e.g., Malcolm
Gladwell,
Project
Dillard,
REVISIONIST
HIST.
(July
8,
2021),
https://www.pushkin.fm/episode/project-dillard/ (highlighting institutions that serve
students from disadvantaged backgrounds even if it undermines their rankings).
See Devon W. Carbado et al., supra note 109; Cheryl Harris, Fisher’s Foible:
From Race and Class to Class not Race, UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE (2017).
267
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commonly deployed to discredit affirmative action as, for example, “reverse
racism.”268
These concerns are not just theoretical. The foregoing dynamics have
shaped how Harvard and UNC continue to defend their own policies.269 As a
result, in litigation that will determine the fate of race-conscious admissions,
an ostensibly adversarial process features uncompromising affirmative
action opponents on one side and conflicted affirmative action advocates on
the other.

2. Budget Goals
Related to brand goals are what I term budget goals. Here, I refer to a
university’s pecuniary interest in maximizing revenues and limiting costs—
both of which can conflict with affirmative action and broader racial
integration commitments.270
We can start with revenues—that is, sources of university income. The
tension between affirmative action and revenues follows from our preceding
discussion about status goals. In the higher education context, revenues come
from two primary sources: tuition and donor giving. A university’s ability to
charge high tuition or demand large donations turn, in large part, on its
prestige. Prestige, as noted, turns on U.S. New Rankings, which overvalue
metrics that advantage students with race and class privilege (that is, wealthy
white students). As a result, meaningful affirmative action efforts can
undercut the metrics that drive rankings, thereby compromising prestige and
depressing what an institution can charge students and expect from donors.271
On the other side of the ledger are costs—that is, a university’s
expenses. Affirmative action, and the more diverse student body it produces,
tends to entail additional administrative expenses. Specifically, when a
268

See Feingold, supra note 16.

269

See id.

Kim, supra note 280, at 958–59 (“[A]s a purely descriptive matter, there is plenty
of evidence to suggest that meaningful affirmative action programs that admit more
than token numbers of underrepresented minorities . . . generate more economic costs
than economic benefits to universities.”).
270

271

Beyond impacting prestige, support for affirmative action or other antiracist
efforts can decrease revenues by alienating alumni who oppose those policies. See
Katie Robertson, Nikole Hannah-Jones Denied Tenure at University of North
Carolina,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
19,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/19/business/media/nikole-hannah-jonesunc.html.
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school reduces reliance on standardized test scores, this can increase five
distinct categories of cost: (1) search costs; (2) yield costs; (3) justification
costs; (4) equal environment costs; and (5) borrowing costs.272 I discuss each
in turn.

(1) Search Costs
Search costs include the time, resources, and human capital necessary
to design and administer admissions systems that consider applicant race. As
a general matter, mechanical and objective processes (e.g., sorting students
by test scores alone) are more efficient, economical, and administrable than
flexible and subjective processes (e.g. holistic review common to many elite
universities). Race-conscious admissions policies can fall on either end of
this spectrum.
On the mechanical end of the spectrum, a university might assign a
numeric score to racial identity.273 On the flexible end of the spectrum, a
school might consider race as one of many factors within a holistic process.
There are pros and cons to both. As a simple matter of cost, the former system
is cheaper. Prior to 2003, a university could have employed a more
mechanical race-conscious process that awarded numerical points to students
on any aspect of their identity—including race. But in Gratz and Grutter, a
pair of 2003 decisions, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits
admissions policies that assign specific numerical scores to racial identity.274
The Court specified that universities may consider race. But to comply with
constitutional requirements, they must employ a “highly individualized,
holistic review” for each applicant that considers race as one of many
factors.275
In short, the Supreme Court identified how a university could consider
applicant race consistent with the Constitution. But that method, as a bare
matter of cost, is more expensive and less administrable than other ways that

See Kim, supra note 280, at 974 (“Effective administration of affirmative action
programs takes up significant financial resources.”).
272

273

See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (assigning a specific numeric score
for various aspects of applicant identity including race).
274

See id.

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (“But the Court required schools to
consider student race flexibly within a holistic review. As Justice Powell made clear
in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible,
nonmechanical way.”).
275
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a school might account for applicant race.276 In other words, for a university
to consider applicant race without violating existing precedent, it must take
on the non-trivial costs associated with a flexible and holistic process.277
Whatever one’s view on affirmative action, Grutter and Gratz made it more
expensive than it might otherwise be.

(2) Yield Costs
Yield costs capture the expenses required to ensure admitted students
from underrepresented racial groups matriculate. For multiple reasons,
students from underrepresented groups—particularly Black and Latinx
students—have lower yield rates than those from other groups.278 To begin,

276

In fact, the University of Michigan identified this concern when defending its
more mechanical process in Gratz. Gratz539 U.S. at 275 (“Respondents contend that
‘[t]he volume of applications and the presentation of applicant information make it
impractical for [LSA] to use the ... admissions system’ upheld by the Court today in
Grutter.”).
277

See Vinay Harpalani, DIVERSITY WITHIN RACIAL GROUPS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463,
537 n.309 (2012) (“These measures may cause institutions to incur more costs, but
colleges and universities have adjusted to similar circumstances in the past: after
Grutter, institutions had to expend more resources on holistic admissions and
eliminate more cost-effective point systems similar to the one struck down in
Gratz.”). See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (“Respondents
contend that ‘[t]he volume of applications and the presentation of applicant
information make it impractical for [university] to use the . . . admissions system’
upheld by the Court today in Grutter . . . But the fact that the implementation of a
program capable of providing individualized consideration might present
administrative challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic
system.” (internal citation omitted). The question is always: “As compared to what?”
To the extent a university already employs holistic review, including racial identity
as one factor among many may not significantly increase search costs. On the other
hand, if the university would otherwise employ a more mechanical approach, the
“holistic review” requirement attached to race is likely to yield a significant delta in
cost.
278

See Kimberly West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black
Bonus, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 592, 626 n.146 (2017) (“Universities may have
ample justification for admitting African American students who fall in this category
at substantially higher rates than similarly situated Asian American and white
applicants because the number of such African American students is comparatively
small and because the ‘yield rate’—the percentage of the very high-scoring African
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students from underrepresented racial groups are disproportionately low- or
middle-income.279 As a result, they need more financial assistance, which the
university must often provide.280 Additionally, there is often heightened
competition among elite schools for “high performing” students of color.281
In short, universities must expend more resources to ensure admitted students
of color matriculate than they do for students from over-represented groups.

(3) Justification Costs
Justification costs capture a university’s ongoing burden to defend—
morally and legally—its right to consider applicant race. As a simple matter
of doctrine, the Supreme Court has made clear that universities can employ
race-conscious admissions only when race-neutral alternatives are
unavailable. This mandate, in effect, places an ongoing and affirmative
obligation on universities to establish that affirmative action is required to
achieve student body diversity. On the ground, this sort of analysis demands
a non-trivial expenditure of institutional resources. In a world of limited
resources, the human capital required to conduct this work is no longer
available to pursue other institutional endeavors.
More generally, affirmative action exacts justification costs anytime a
private party or state actor challenges an existing affirmative action policy.
On the legal front, this can entail marshalling resources to litigate civil suits
or manage federal investigations. But even when challenges are not legal per
se, universities must deploy institutional resources—e.g., communication
campaigns necessary to defuse public attacks and legitimate existing
practices.

American students who decide to enroll subsequent to their admission—is often
significantly lower than similarly situated Asian American and white applicants.”).
See also William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for
the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 77-78 (2013) (observing that after Prop. 209
passed, yield rates for high performing Black and Latinx admits declined at eight UC
campuses relative to their white and Asian counterparts).
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See id.
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Beyond yield, students from low- and middle-income families are more likely to
encounter economic or other hardships while in school. The costs associated with
these hardships, accordingly, fall heavier on schools that admit a higher percentage
of students from low- and middle-income families. See Gladwell, supra note 288.
281

See id.
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(4) Equal Learning Environment Costs
Equal environment costs capture the resources required to create and
maintain a learning environment that supports students from historically
underrepresented groups.282 These costs arise, in part, because most elite
universities were never designed for students of color—let alone students
without inherited class advantage.283 As a result, constructing a university
that permits all students to thrive requires investing in a range of resources
unnecessary in more homogenous (that is, wealthy and white)
environments.284 Moreover, as student diversity increases, so does the
likelihood of conflict and disagreement—challenges that require more
institutional investment.

(5) Borrowing Costs
Borrowing costs capture a university’s ability to access capital
necessary for institutional expansion and investment.285 Professor WestFaulcon has outlined how affirmative action (and, more broadly, inclusive
admissions practices) can produce borrowing costs:
The three major financial rating agencies—Moody’s Investors
Service, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch Ratings—consider average SAT
scores as part of their credit analyses. Because it has become
increasingly common for colleges and universities to issue bonds to
raise money for major expansion projects, many institutions have a
very direct financial incentive to try to increase their overall average
SAT score. The fact that average SAT score is used to gauge
institutional financial health as well as prestige encourages admissions
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See generally Feingold, supra note 246.
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This backdrop helps to explain why Historically Black Colleges and Universities
(HBCUs)—which were created to serve Black students—continue to better
education Black students than do White Serving Institutions. See Stacy Hawkins,
Reverse Integration: Centering HBCUs in the Fight for Educational Equality, 24(3)
U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 2021 (2020).
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See id.

See Kim, supra note 280, at 976 (“Another reason why meaningful affirmative
action programs may generate more economic costs than economic benefits to
universities is that affirmative action programs may negatively impact the
university's bond ratings.”).
285
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officials to place even greater weight on SAT scores as an admissions
criterion.286
To summarize, robust affirmative action programs can exact multiple
discrete but intersecting administrative costs. To be clear, I am not suggesting
that these costs outweigh the benefits of, and need for, race-conscious
admissions. Rather, as throughout, my goal is to excavate additional
institutional priorities that can conflict with affirmative action. As with brand
goals, budgetary goals complicate a university’s relationship with affirmative
action—even if racial inclusion is a genuine institutional prerogative. In the
section that follows, I outline one final institutional commitment that can
render elite universities ambivalent affirmative action advocates: risk
aversion.

C. Risk Aversion
Elite universities, as with other institutions, try to minimize legal risk.
For present purposes, I highlight three ways that risk aversion can
disincentivize behavior necessary to tell a capacious and compelling
affirmative action story. Specifically, risk aversion can: (1) chill lawful
conduct; (2) chill evidence gathering; and (3) chill theory development. I
discuss each in turn.

1. Chill Lawful Behavior
To begin, risk aversion threatens affirmative action (and, more broadly,
racial inclusion) because it can lead a university to eliminate, suspend, or
otherwise limit lawful race-conscious behavior. As one example, recall how
UC responded to Proposition 209 and SP-1.287 After voters and the Regents
adopted these measures, UC eliminated all race-conscious practices across
sites of university governance. This extended beyond admissions practices
to, for example, recruitment and retention efforts.288
This response can be understood as risk aversion leading a university to
terminate lawful behavior. Consider the following: To begin, UC could have
raised multiple arguments to challenge the measures—both concerning their
general force and specific application vis-à-vis race-conscious practices. For
example, UC could have argued that Prop. 209, because it prohibits
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West-Faulcon, supra note 111, at 1105. See also Gladwell, supra note 288.
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See West-Faulcon, supra note 111.
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See supra Part II.2(2) (discussing UC response to Prop. 209 and SP-1).
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“preferential treatment,” permits race-conscious practices that mitigate racial
advantages white students tend to enjoy in admissions and on campus.289
Beyond conceding available legal arguments, UC also adopted a broad
reading of Prop. 209’s scope that included recruitment and retention
practices. But as noted above, the term “preferential treatment” is far from
self-defining. UC could have adopted a more aggressive posture that
confined Prop. 209’s mandate to admissions. It chose not to—and instead
terminated multiple race-conscious programs that benefitted the university
and arguably escaped Prop. 209’s mandate.
The point is not that UC would have necessarily prevailed. Rather, it is
that UC adopted a conservative strategy that prioritized reducing legal
exposure.290 Put differently, given UC’s earnest commitment to racial
inclusion, it is hard to explain this response without accounting for risk
aversion—a competing institutional concern.
More recent examples include universities who dropped existing raceconscious programs after receiving formal or informal complaints. In 2019,
Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center School of Medicine
abandoned its long-standing race-conscious admissions policy following
threats of federal action. 291 This example is noteworthy, in part, because
existing Supreme Court law entitled Texas Tech to consider applicant race
as part of a holistic process to ensure a racially diverse student body. In other
words, the law was on the university’s side. Nonetheless, the threat of a
federal investigation—and the costs involved—led the school to pull its
program.
This dynamic has been amplified since President Trump issued his
initial “anti-CRT” Executive Order in 2020. In the wake of that order—which
a federal court subsequently enjoined—Stanford University directed
employees to avoid references to “structural or systemic racism” within

289

See supra Part II.2.(2) (outlining arguments UC could have made to defend the
continued use of race-conscious admissions).
Risk aversion concerns continue to animate UC’s public Prop. 209 guidance. See
Guidelines for Addressing Race and Gender Equity in Academic Programs in
Compliance with Proposition 209, Office of General Counsel, University of
California
(July
2015),
https://diversity.universityofcalifornia.edu/files/documents/prop-209-guidelinesogc-full.pdf.
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See Michelle Hackman, U.S. Requires Texas Tech Med School to End Use of Race
in
Admissions
Decisions,
WALL
ST .
J.
(Apr.
9,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-to-require-texas-tech-to-enduse-of-race-in-admissions-decision-11554829163.
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“Diversity Trainings.”292 The response provoked immediate and widespread
backlash.293 One vein of critique highlighted how Stanford—by prohibiting
discussion of terms such as “structural racism”—transcended Trump’s actual
Executive Order.294 Following public outcry, Stanford reversed course. But
their behavior was far from unique. Even today, teachers across the country
report self-censorship of what they believe to be legal conduct—for fear of
legal and political backlash.295

2. Chill Evidence Gathering
Even for universities that employ affirmative action, risk aversion can
dissuade institutions from gathering and analyzing evidence that would
fortify the legal case for their existing program. Specifically, institutions may
be reluctant to compile evidence of past or present racial discrimination.296
Why the reluctance? Because even if evidence of discrimination would
strengthen the case for affirmative action, it might also expose the university
to legal liability.297
This concern is not new. For decades, judges, scholars, and intervenors
have cited this tension to explain why universities cannot adequately defend
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See Khari Johnson, Stanford rushes to comply with Trump Executive Order
Limiting
Diversity
Training,
Venture
Beat
(Nov.
17,
2020),
https://venturebeat.com/2020/11/17/stanford-rushes-to-comply-with-trumpexecutive-order-limiting-diversity-training/.
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See id.
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Michele
Dauber,
Twitter
(Nov.
16,
2020),
https://twitter.com/mldauber/status/1328235391019728896?s=20&t=jtGdUTtP7hm
BkjhkBuW-Zg.
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See Eesha Pendharkar, Efforts to Ban Critical Race Theory Now Restrict Teaching
for a Third of America’s Kids, Education Week (Jan. 27, 2022),
https://www.edweek.org/leadership/efforts-to-ban-critical-race-theory-now-restrictteaching-for-a-third-of-americas-kids/2022/01.
Alan Jenkins raised this precise concern when he observed that “by proffering
evidence of the racial disparities that would exist absent the use of race-sensitive
policies, affirmative action defendants expose themselves to potential liability to
minority applicants.” Jenkins, supra note 12, at 308–09.
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See id.
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their own programs.298 The following articulation, from the Gratz
intervenors, is illustrative:
[C]ourts in other cases have repeatedly recognized, even those
educational institutions that purport to defend affirmative action
admissions policies are unlikely to proffer defenses that would call
attention to their own past, let alone any present, discrimination.299
This is not to suggest that concern about legal risk is the only dynamic
that incentivizes universities to downplay evidence of discrimination.300 As
noted above, such evidence might also cut against a school’s brand goals.301

298

United Steel Workers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210
(1979), (Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting that “on the one hand they face
liability for past discrimination against blacks, and on the other they face liability to
whites for any voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate the effects of prior
discrimination against blacks.”); Memorandum in Support of Proposed DefendantIntervenors’ Motion to Intervene, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &
Fellows of Harvard Coll. 308 F.R.D. 39 (D.Mass.), aff’d., 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir.
2015) (No. 14-cv-14176); Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed DefendantIntervenors’ Motion to Intervene at 15, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ.
of N. Carolina, 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 14-cv-954).
299

See Gratz Motion to Intervene, Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich.
1998), rev’d sub nom Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th cir. 1999) (No. 97-CV75231-DT) (citing Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 849 (E.D. Mich. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983) (“One way to
minimize the employer’s dilemma in a reverse discrimination case is to allow
intervention by parties who have an incentive to introduce evidence of past
discrimination.); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1082 n.47 (D. Md.
1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of reh'g, 46 F.3d 5
(4th Cir. 1994) (“It is worthy of note that the University is (to put it mildly) in a
somewhat unusual situation. It is not often that a litigant is required to engage in
extended self-criticism in order to justify its pursuit of a goal that it deems worthy.
All other matters aside, UMCP administrators are to be commended for the moral
courage that they have demonstrated in undertaking this self-examination with an
admirable degree of candor.”).
Lawrence, supra note 154, at 956–57 (“Perhaps the University’s rejection of the
remedial defense can be explained by its concern that by admitting its own
discriminatory practices it would expose itself to liability vis-a-vis minority
applicants and students.”).
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See id. (arguing that a “University’s reluctance to admit past and present
discrimination is . . . the faculty’s and administration’s reluctance to examine and
admit their own participation in racism and to give up the advantages the current
system affords them.”).
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Still, risk aversion remains a motivating force that renders universities
compromised affirmative action advocates.

3. Chill Theory Development
A final consequence of risk aversion implicates theory development.
One can think of this as a companion to the discussion on evidence gathering.
In that context, self-interest dissuades universities from gathering facts that
might reveal unlawful racial discrimination. A similar motivation can
dissuade universities from endorsing theories of discrimination that, if legally
cognizable, could implicate the university.
The ongoing Harvard litigation offers a useful case study. One of the
plaintiff’s principal claims is that Harvard discriminates against Asian
American applicants. To prevail on this count under governing caselaw, the
plaintiffs must establish discriminatory purpose or intent. Evidence of
disparate impact, alone, is insufficient.302 This doctrinal backdrop poses a
significant hurdle for the plaintiffs. Even with evidence that Asian applicants
face disparate treatment within Harvard’s admissions process, the district
court and First Circuit rejected the claim because the plaintiffs could not
prove intent.303 In so doing, the courts inoculated from legal scrutiny antiAsian discrimination that occurred before (but was infused within) Harvard’s
review of applicants and the role of implicit biases.304 To place this dynamic
into sharper relief, even as the district court dismissed this discrimination

One exception comes from Title VI’s implementing regulations, which contain a
disparate impact provision. See Feingold, supra note 16 (discussing Title VI’s
implementing regulations).
302

303

The evidence of disparate treatment implicates facially race-neutral components
of Harvard’s admissions process. See Feingold, supra at 251 (explaining that
evidence of anti-Asian bias, because it tends to benefit white applicants, derives from
facially race-neutral components of Harvard’s admissions process).
SFFA v. Harvard, 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 171 (D. Mass. 2019) (“Taking account of
all the available evidence, it is possible that implicit biases had a slight negative
effect on average Asian American personal ratings, but the Court concludes that the
majority of the disparity in the personal rating between white and Asian American
applicants was more likely caused by race-affected inputs to the admissions process
(e.g. recommendations or high school accomplishments) or underlying differences
in the attributes that may have resulted in stronger personal ratings.”).
304
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claim, it noted that Harvard’s admissions “process would likely benefit from
conducting implicit bias trainings for admissions officers.”305
For present purposes, the key take-away is that, from a risk-aversion
perspective, Harvard benefits when antidiscrimination law requires plaintiffs
to prove intent. Under such a regime, Harvard can evade most—if not all—
claims of discrimination that attack facially race-neutral dimensions of its
admissions process (among other sites of institutional governance). For this
reason, Harvard has no obvious incentive to advocate for a thicker conception
of discrimination that encompasses, for example, disparate impact or
unintentional disparate treatment. This played out in the litigation. As one
would expect, Harvard contested the discrimination claim by citing the
absence of discriminatory intent.306
This response might strengthen Harvard’s position vis-à-vis
discrimination claims. But it neither benefits affirmative action nor
affirmative action’s standard beneficiaries: students from underrepresented
racial groups. To begin, existing antidiscrimination doctrine insulates
standard institutional arrangements from legal scrutiny—even if those
policies or practices reproduce racial inequality. In this sense, Harvard is
actively entrenching a legal regime better suited to perpetuate than remedy
the status quo. But the effects extend even more directly to affirmative action.
If courts accepted disparate impact or unintentional disparate treatment as
cognizable discrimination, that would immediately broaden the remedial
rationales available to affirmative action advocates. In other words, when
Harvard defends a narrow conception of unlawful discrimination, it
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See id. at 204.
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See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellee, Students for Fair Admission v. Harvard,
2020 WL 2521577 at *48 (“The district court found that the statistical evidence “does
not demonstrate any intent by admissions officers to discriminate,” or otherwise
show that “Harvard has engaged in improper intentional discrimination.” This
finding was well supported.”) (internal citations omitted).
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undercuts its own ability to justify race-consciousness as essential antidiscrimination.307
CONCLUSION
We are at pivotal political moment. 2020’s global uprising for racial justice
triggered a rightwing campaign against antiracism itself. Affirmative action
is again headed to the Supreme Court. Even if the outcome appears
inevitable, affirmative action litigation—and the public discourse it
generates—remains a site of broader contestation over the ongoing relevance
of race and racism in America—and the need, if any, for race-conscious
reform. In effect, Harvard and UNC are now the last line of defense between
affirmative action and a hostile Court. They enjoy an outsized opportunity to
shape our national conversation about who we are as a nation. Despite this
privileged position, institutional elements common to elite universities
render Harvard and UNC far from zealous affirmative action advocates. As
a result, our formal affirmative action champions will likely compromise
their own policies and weaken broader efforts to reckon with America’s
legacy of racial subordination. For those committed to antiracist reform and
multiracial democracy, it is critical to understand why affirmative action’s
formal champions remain ambivalent advocates. Doing so is unlikely to alter
the trajectories of ongoing litigation, but it can help chart a path for what
comes after affirmative action.

Beyond legal risk aversion, a motivating factor may be the university’s desire to
retain autonomy over its admissions practices. See Jenkins, supra note 12, at 314 (“In
the affirmative action context, defendants have an interest not only in avoiding
liability, but also in maintaining selection criteria and other operating procedures that
are easy to administer, relatively inexpensive, and enjoy broad support.
Beneficiaries, in contrast, are generally unconcerned with the particular mechanisms
that are used, so long as they are fair and preserve equal opportunity.”).
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